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"How is it that the American judicial system is throwing women in jail
for overdue library books but at the same time telling pornographers that
they are free to continue to make child pornography on computers?"' This
was the question asked by Representative Joseph R. Pitts of Pennsylvania on
May 14, 2002, a month after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.2 Representative Pitts told the story of a
woman from Hazelton, Pennsylvania, who was put in jail for failing to pay
fines for overdue library books? He compared this woman's plight with the
Supreme Court decision and noted, "[S]omething is very wrong here.",
4
Whether or not Representative Pitts's statement recognizes the
complexity of the question of the constitutionality of laws regulating virtual
child pornography, and whether or not it is completely logical to see a
connection between stiff punishments for overdue library books and
perceived leniency for makers of child pornography, the statement does
illustrate the social and emotional implications of the Court's decision.5
Without considering the reasoning behind the decision, many people feel
that something must be done about virtual child pornography.6 Ernest E.
Allen of the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children7 testified that
"the Court's decision will result in the proliferation of child pornography in
America, unlike anything we have seen in more than twenty years."' 8 He
expressed his concern that, after the Court's decision, pedophiles will still
"sexually victimize children" and "photograph those acts," but that they will
morph and manipulate the images so that the children are not identifiable.9
Since a morphed image is "virtual," pornographers will avoid prosecution.'l
Certainly, it is hoped that Mr. Allen is wrong. However, in any case, an
examination of the Ashcroft decision can demonstrate to lawmakers what
they may not do in their efforts to regulate virtual child pornography."
Perhaps understanding what is not acceptable may shed light on what is
acceptable, giving guidance to lawmakers in their efforts to regulate virtual
child pornography. 2
1. 148 CONG. REC. H2393-01 (daily ed. May 14, 2002) (Statement of Rep. Pitts).
2. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
3. 148 CONG. REC. H2393-01 (daily ed. May 14, 2002) (Statement of Rep. Pitts).
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See Virtual Child Pornography: The Impact of the Supreme Court Decision in the Case of
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. of Crime, Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 13-18 (2002) (testimony of Ernest E. Allen, President & Chief Executive
Officer of the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children) [hereinafter Testimony of Ernest
E. Allen].
7. The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children is a non-profit corporation
congressionally mandated by the Children's Assistance Act of 1984. 42 U.S.C. § 5771 (1994). It
works with the U.S. Department of Justice as the national resource center on the issue of missing and
exploited children. Testimony of Ernest E. Allen, supra note 6.
8. Testimony of Ernest E. Allen, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See infra Part II.E (analyzing the Ashcroft decision).
12. See infra Part III.A (discussing Congress's amendment to the law challenged in Ashcroft v.
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In Ashcroft, the Court struck down portions of the Child Pornography
Protection Act (CPPA) that criminalize images that "appear[] to be" of
minors engaged in sexually explicit activity for. overbreadth. 3 Specifically,
the Court found that the statute did not require the material to be obscene
and yet the state had not shown a compelling state interest in regulating non-
obscene sexual speech.' 4 The result is that Congress can only regulate
virtual child pornography if it is obscene.' 5 However, lawmakers remain
concerned that the obscenity doctrine will not be sufficient to stop the
creation of virtual child pornography.'
6
This note will examine the recent Court decision in Ashcroft. Part I will
look at the background and context of the CPPA. Part II will look at the
Court's reasoning and offer alternative ways of viewing the CPPA. Part III
will look at the reaction of Congress to the Court's decision, its amendment
to the CPPA, and whether that amendment will pass constitutional muster.
Finally, Part III will also make specific policy recommendations in line with
the Court's reasoning in hopes of answering the question "how can virtual
child pornography be banned under the First Amendment?"
I. BACKGROUND: OBSCENITY AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
In Ashcroft, the Court was guided by two main doctrines that could be
applied to the problem of virtual child pornography: obscenity and child
pornography. 7 In order to understand how these doctrines dictated the
decision, it is important to look at the development of each. The progression
began with Roth v. United States.'
8
A. Roth v. United States
In Roth, the Court found that obscene speech is wholly without
constitutional protection.' 9  Because obscene speech is without value, it
merits no protection under the First Amendment.2 ° In Roth, two defendants,
Roth and Alberts, were charged and convicted under federal and California
obscenity statutes, respectively. 2' Roth was convicted of mailing obscene
circulars and advertising and mailing an obscene book, while Alberts was
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)).
13. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241-42, 258.
14. Id. at 251.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H2393-01 (daily ed. May 14, 2002) (Statement of Rep. Pitts).
17. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 240.
18. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
19. Id. at 492.
20. Id. at 484.
21. Id. at480-81.
827
convicted of keeping for sale obscene and indecent books and of producing
obscene advertisements for the books.22
The Court, in considering a First Amendment challenge to the statutes
under which the defendants were convicted, relied partially on Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire.23 In Chaplinsky, the Court had declared that certain
categories of speech are wholly without protection because "it is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under
all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem., 24 The Court in Roth concluded
that obscenity is one of these categories. Sexual speech no doubt has
value; society may benefit from discussions of human sexuality, whether
educational, political, literary, or artistic. 26  However, obscenity is "no
essential part of any exposition of ideas" and is of "such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 27 Thus, obscenity
joined ranks with libel and fighting words, "those [types of speech] which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace," which Chaplinsky had concluded were without protection.28
In Roth, the Court further considered the appellants' argument that
obscenity law merely punished impure thoughts, rather than that which was
related to "overt antisocial conduct" and incited such conduct.29  The
background to this argument was that speech could only be regulated if it
created a "clear and present danger of antisocial conduct."3 ° This theory
arose from Schenk v. United States, in which the Court had held that
Congress can suppress certain types of speech if they present a clear and
present danger that Congress has a right to prevent.3 t The Court in Roth
22. Id.
23. Id. at 485.
24. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
25. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
26. Id. at 487. The Court elaborated:
The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient
reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.
Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of
absorbing interest to [hulmankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of
human interest and public concern.
Id.
27. Id. at 485.
28. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
29. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485-86.
30. Id. at 486.
31. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 70
A.2d 389, 390 (Pa. 1950) (holding that an obscenity law's scope "must be defined with regard to the
universal right of free speech [or press], as limited only by some universally valid restriction
required by a clear and present danger"). Justice Warren also took the clear and present danger
approach in his concurrence in Roth. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 495 (Warren, J., concurring). Without
using the language "clear and present danger," Justice Warren concluded that "[p]resent laws depend
largely upon the effect that the materials may have upon those who receive them." Id.
828
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concluded, however, that no clear and present danger needed to be shown.
32
Because the speech was wholly without value and therefore without
protection, it was immaterial whether it incited any particular conduct.33
Implicit in the Court's holding, that it was not necessary to show a clear and
present danger, was the conclusion that no clear and present danger could be
shown.34
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the standard to be applied in
obscenity cases is whether "to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest.
35
B. Miller v. California
Roth's obscenity standard, however, was refined in Miller v. California,
which provides the current obscenity test.3 6  In Miller, the appellant mass
mailed advertisements for the sale of illustrated "adult" books.37 Subsequent
to Roth, in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, the Court had refined the obscenity
test to require three elements: (1) the dominant theme of the speech, taken as
a whole, appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (2) the speech is patently
offensive as affronting contemporary community standards; and (3) it is
"utterly without redeeming social value. '38 In Miller, the Court rejected the
third prong of this test, "utterly without redeeming social value. 39 This
32. Roth, 354 U.S. at 486.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("There is a large school of thought, particularly in the
scientific community[,] which denies any causal connection between the reading of pornography and
immorality, crime, or delinquency."); accord William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Literature,
the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN L. REV. 295 (1954). In considering the effects
of obscenity on conduct, Lockhart and McClure concluded, notwithstanding the ambiguities as to
what type of conduct would be sufficiently antisocial, that there was a "doubtful assumption that a
causal relationship exists between reading a book that suggests or incites sexual thoughts and the
conduct of the reader, a proposition on which there is little or no reliable information." Id. at 332-33
(emphasis added). Moreover, the authors concluded that, to the extent that courts had tacitly
assumed that sexual thoughts translate into action, the assumption was of "doubtful validity." Id. at
333.
35. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
36. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Court struggled with the definition of
obscenity for fifteen years. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982). During this period, the
Court held firm to the holding in Roth that there is a legitimate state interest in prohibiting obscenity
while at the same time recognizing the "inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of
expression." Id. at 755 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 23). The struggle over the definition illustrates
this difficulty and the Court's attempt to strike an appropriate balance. Id.
37. Miller, 413 U.S. at 17.
38. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
39. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25 ("We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the 'utterly without
redeeming social value' test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts."). The Court in Miller further pointed
out that the Memoirs test was the result of a plurality opinion in which only three Justices had joined.
Id. at 21.
prong was unworkable, requiring the "prosecution to prove a negative,"
which was a "burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal
standards of proof., 40 Rather, the Court adopted a different three-prong test:
[1] whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; ... [2] whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and [3] whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.41
The Court also considered whether use of a national or state standard
was more appropriate in determining whether the work appeals to the
prurient interest.42 The Court concluded that a national standard would be
unworkable; the nation is too large and diverse for a national consensus to be
reached.43 Therefore, whether a work appeals to the prurient interest is a
question of fact based on the locality of the jury.44 Further, the Court noted,
"[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound" to interpret the
Constitution so that "people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction
of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York City. '45  The
assumption underlying this statement appears to be that people in Maine or
Mississippi may have more stringent standards for what appeals to the
prurient interest than people in Las Vegas or New York, and therefore may
find some works obscene that would not be obscene in those cities.46
Interestingly, the Court drew this conclusion while at the same time
intending to stay true to another proposition from Roth: that the material be
judged by its impact on the average person rather than by its impact on a
"particularly susceptible or sensitive person., 47 Under the Miller standard,
while the material is no longer judged by the most susceptible person, it is
now effectively judged by the most susceptible community, given the
national distribution of many works.48  However, the Court rejected this
argument, concluding that, even under the "national criteria," there would be
some works that would be acceptable in some places but not in others.49
40. Id. at 22.
41. Id. at 24 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
42. Id. at 30-34.
43. Id. at 30.
44. Id. The Court made this statement notwithstanding the general proposition that, under the
United States Constitution, First Amendment limitations on the powers of the states should not vary
from community to community. Id.
45. Id. at 32.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 33. This proposition was a rejection of a doctrine originating in Regina v. Hicklin, 3
Q.B. 360 (1868). The Hicklin test judged obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most
susceptible persons. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957). The use of the community
standard is meant to provide a more balanced approach so as not to make the test too restrictive. Id.
48. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32-33 n.13. This argument is especially true when considering works that
are distributed over the internet and therefore, necessarily, internationally. See Dennis W. Chiu,
Obscenity on the Internet: Local Community Standards for Obscenity are Unworkable on the
Information Superhighway, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 185 (1995).
49. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32-33 n.13. The Court also rejected the argument that a community
830
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C. New York v. Ferber
The specific question of child pornography was decided in New York v.
Ferber.50 In Ferber, a bookstore owner was convicted under a New York
statute that prohibited the knowing promotion of a sexual performance by a
child under age sixteen by distributing material that depicted such a
performance. 5' The Court concluded that the statute was constitutional even
though it did not require the material to be obscene.52 The Court reasoned
that "prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children" constitutes a
government objective of great importance.53 Children were harmed in the
making of the pornography, and there is a compelling state interest in ending
this harm. 54  Additionally, the Court concluded that distribution of child
pornography can be punished because the material depicting the minors
leaves a permanent record of the child's participation in the harm that is
exacerbated by distribution and, in order to cut off the creation of child
pornography, the distribution channels of pornography have to be cut off.55
The Court concluded that it is not necessary for the state to show the
material is obscene because the relevant question is not whether the work
meets the test for obscenity under Miller, but whether a child was harmed in
the process of making the material.56 Finally, the Court concluded that the
value of permitting depictions of "children engaged in lewd sexual conduct
is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis."57 If necessary for the literary,
artistic, or scientific merit of the work, an older person who looks younger
can be used or mere simulations of the acts outside the prohibitions of the
statute can be employed.58
standard impairs the flow of interstate commerce: "Obscene material may be validly regulated by a
State ... to protect the general welfare of its population despite some possible incidental effect on
the flow of such materials across state lines." Id.
50. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
51. Id. at 750-51.
52. Id. at 756.
53. Id. at 757.
54. Id. at 758.
55. Id. at 759. The theory is that production of child pornography will continue until the market
for the material dries up and severe criminal penalties are imposed on those who sell, advertise, or
otherwise promote the product. Id. at 760. "The advertising and selling of child pornography
provide an economic motive" for the illegal production of such materials. Id. at 761.
56. Id. "'It is irrelevant to the child [who has been abused] whether or not the material ... has a
literary, artistic, political or social value."' Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, a "sexually explicit
depiction need not be 'patently offensive' in order to have required the sexual exploitation of a child
for its production." Id.
57. Id. at 762.
58. Id. at 762-63.
D. Osborne v. Ohio
After Ferber, the Court concluded that the possession of child
pornography can also be criminalized in Osborne v. Ohio.59 In this case, the
appellant was convicted after police found four photographs in the
appellant's home.6 In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court had held that the state
cannot criminalize private possession of obscene material; to do so impinges
on a person's "right to receive information in the privacy of his home, and
[the] justifications for [the] law [are] inadequate."' 61 However, in Osborne,
the Court noted that "Stanley was a narrow holding," and that the state
interests in regulating possession of child pornography are greater than the
interests in regulating obscenity. 62 First, rather than expressing concern with
public morality, the concern is to protect victims of child pornography.63
Second, as in Ferber, the Court reasoned that curbing possession would curb
the market for and therefore the production of child pornography. 64 Finally,
evidence suggested "that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other
children into sexual activity. 65  The Court described these interests as
grave.66
E. Background to the CPPA
While the creation, distribution, and possession of child pornography
have been held to be unprotected speech, technological advances have begun
to obviate the need to use real children.67 While child pornography is
proliferating, these technological advances only exacerbate the problem, as
more people have access to the material through the internet.68  Computers
59. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
60. Id. at 107.
61. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-68 (1969).
62. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108.
63. Id. at 109.
64. Id. at 109-10.
65. Id. at 11. There was nothing in the opinion that suggested that this rationale alone would be
sufficient to justify the holding. See id. It was additional to the market deterrence and victim
protection rationales. See id.
66. See id.
67. Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional
Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 439, 439 (1997).
68. See, e.g., Maimon Alan, New Initiatives Needed to Fight Child Porn, Officials Say U.S.
Attorney Wants United Effort Against Exploitation Via Web, COURIER J., Dec. 6, 2002, at B; Jerry
Seper, Blue Ridge Team Nabs Pedophiles, WASH. TIMES, July 15, 2002, at BI (reporting that there
are over 100,000 web sites devoted to child pornography as well as countless chat rooms and
message boards); Rebecca Allison, Child Porn Websites Trigger 36 Arrests, THE GUARDIAN, May
21, 2002, at P5 (noting that "[p]eople who access child pornography are fueling the widespread and
often organised [sic] sexual abuse of children by peadophiles [sic] across the world"). Some have
argued that computers are even the primary means of distributing child pornography. See John C.
Scheller, Note, PC Peep Show: Computers, Privacy, and Child Pornography, 27 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 989, 990 (1994). Additionally, the problem is international in scope. See Scott Dean,
Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, PA. L. J., Apr. 12, 1993, at A-I. Finally, for a thorough and
compelling discussion of child pornography on the internet, how it is accessed, and the current law
enforcement problems in this area, see PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
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have also allowed a revolution in the creation of child pornography. 69 It is
no longer necessary to use a real child-rather, images can be created via
computer.7 ° As a response to these developments, Congress passed the
CPPA in 1996. 7' While the act retained a provision against the types of
depictions forbidden in Ferber, it also added three provisions-those that
were ultimately at issue in Ashcroft.72
II. ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION: THE COURT CONSIDERS A FIRST
AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE CPPA.
In Ashcroft, the Free Speech Coalition, a California trade association for
the adult entertainment industry, a publisher of a book promoting the nudist
lifestyle, a painter of nudes, and a photographer specializing in erotic images
brought a pre-enforcement challenge to the CPPA.73 Specifically, they
challenged two provisions of the CPPA. First, they challenged 18 U.S.C. §
2256(8)(B), which prohibited "'any visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image
or picture' that "'is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.' 74 This provision captured not only computer-generated
images, or "virtual child pornography," but also images created by more
traditional means, such as paintings, and those images that appear to be of
children, but are, in fact, of adults.75 The second challenge was to 18 U.S.C.
ON THE INTERNET (2001).
69. Burke, supra note 67, at 439.
70. Id. Morphed images of real children (as opposed to virtually created images) have been the
focus of some scholarship. See Burke, supra note 67, at 440-41. However, the Court in Ashcroft
upheld the provision of the CPPA regulating these images (and it was not challenged) because they
"implicate the interests of real children and are in that sense closer to the images in Ferber."
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002). However,
new photographic and computer imaging technologies make it possible to produce by
electronic, mechanical, or other means, visual depictions of what appear to be children
engaging in sexually explicit conduct that are virtually indistinguishable to the
unsuspecting viewer from untouched photographic images of actual children engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000), Cong. Finding 5.
These images are not just altered images, but images wholly created by computer. Id. at Cong.
Finding 6(B); see also United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that
pornographic images may be derived from a simple cartoon character or high-resolution image
resembling a real child). They may also include images of adults altered to look like children. See
Burke, supra note 67, at 440-41. Images using youthful-looking adults were also at issue in
Ashcroft. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000), Cong. Findings 1-13; see also 148 CONG. REC. S4389-01 (daily
ed. May 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Carnahan) (discussing the problems with virtual child
pornography and why the CPPA was passed).
72. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241.
73. Id. at 242.
74. Id. at 241 (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000)).
75. Id.
§ 2256(8)(D).76 This provision defined child pornography as any sexually
explicit image that is "'advertised, presented, described, or distributed in
such a manner that conveys the impression' [that] it depicts "'a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct."' 77  This provision was aimed at
pandering, but the Court concluded that it even punished those who possess
the pornography but took no part in the pandering.78 The provisions were
challenged as overbroad.79
A. Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy, with whom Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined, found the first provision was overbroad
first because it did not require the material to be obscene as required under
Miller.80  The majority reasoned that, without requiring obscenity, any
material that shows what appears to be juveniles in sexually explicit activity
may be subject to criminal prosecution, including works that are innocent,
such as a picture in a psychology manual and a movie depicting the horrors
of sexual abuse. 8' Additionally, the Court found that there are many works
of artistic value that could be subject to the law, such as the critically-
acclaimed, award-winning films American Beauty and Traffic.82 The Court
concluded that whether or not these films did in fact violate the CPPA, they
were within the "wide sweep" of the CPPA's prohibitions.83 While, under
obscenity law, the entire work is considered to determine whether or not it
has literary, artistic, or scientific value, under the CPPA the presence of one
sexually explicit scene could bring the work within the statute's reach.
84
Next, the Court found that the provision was overbroad because, while
under Ferber, child pornography was not required to be obscene, this was
due to the fact that that provision was aimed at how the work was created,
not at its content.85 Under Ferber, even if a work has value, if it exploits
children, it is not permitted. 86 However, when virtual child pornography is
created, no actual children are harmed in its making.87 Additionally, the
Court concluded that the sexually explicit images of children are not by
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 243. Another provision of the CPPA that prohibited morphing images of real children
into sexual positions was not challenged. Id.
80. Id. at 243-46.
81. ld. at 246.
82. Id. at 247-48. American Beauty won the Academy Award for Best Picture in 2000. Traffic
was nominated for Best Picture in 2001. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 248.
85. Id. at 249.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 250. "Virtual child pornography is not 'intrinsically related' to the sexual abuse of
children, as were the materials in Ferber." Id. (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759
(1982)).
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definition without value, and that, in fact, Ferber acknowledged that if such
images do have value, they can be created using youthful-looking adults.88
In short, the Court determined that Ferber's justifications do not apply to
virtual child pornography, and so Ferber could not be used to offer support
to the CPPA.89
After finding that the previous justifications for prohibiting child
pornography-obscenity and abuse of children-were not required by the
CPPA, the Court considered alternative justifications for regulating virtual
child pornography. 90
First, the government argued that the CPPA was "necessary because
pedophiles may use virtual child pornography to seduce children."9  The
Court rejected this argument as insufficient to justify the prohibition on
speech.92 The Court concluded that, although the government can punish
adults who show these materials to children,93 speech that is "within the
rights of adults to hear may not be silenced completely in an attempt to
shield children from it."' 94 The Court concluded that basing the prohibitions
on the possibility that the material will be seen by children would result in
reducing the adult population to viewing only material that is fit for children,
and that the Court has repeatedly disallowed such a result.95
Second, the government argued that virtual child pornography, like real
child pornography, can "whet[] the appetites of pedophiles and encourage[]
them to engage in illegal conduct. ' 96  However, the Court stated that the
causal connection between the speech and the illegal conduct was not
88. Id.
89. Id. at 250. The Court stated, "Ferber, then, not only referred to the distinction between
actual and virtual child pornography, it relied on it as a reason supporting its holding. Ferber
provides no support for a statute that eliminates the distinction and makes the alternative mode
criminal as well." Id.
90. Id. The Court explained that "[t]he CPPA, for reasons we have explored, is inconsistent with
Miller and finds no support in Ferber. The Government seeks to justify its prohibitions in other
ways." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 251-52; see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding punishment
of a storeowner who sold a "girlie" magazine to a sixteen-year-old in violation of a state statute).
94. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 252; see also Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1957)
(refusing to allow prohibition of adult communication simply because it could be harmful to
children).
95. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 252-53; see United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803
(2000) (striking down statute that required cable television providers to either scramble adult
programming or limit it to certain hours unless it was the least restrictive means of preventing
children from seeing or hearing adult material); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844
(1997) (striking down statute aimed at protecting children from harmful materials on the internet);
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (striking down statute that prohibited making available to
the general public a book with a potentially negative influence on youth).
96. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253.
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sufficient. 97 The Court concluded that the best way to deter illegal activity is
to punish the activity, but that there can be no restraints on a person's
thoughts because of the indefinite possibility that that person may at some
time engage in illegal conduct as a result of the thoughts. 98
Third, the government argued that the "objective of eliminating the
market for pornography produced using real children necessitates a
prohibition on virtual images as well." 99 This is because virtual and real
images are "part of the same market"-the creation of one promotes the
creation of the other.' °  The Court quickly rejected this argument as
"implausible."' 0 ' It concluded that "[i]f virtual images were identical to
illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be driven from the
market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few pornographers would risk
prosecution by abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would
suffice."'
102
Finally, the government argued that, because of the similarity between
real and virtual images, prosecution of real pornography would be more
difficult. 0 3 Even experts may have trouble telling the difference between a
real and a virtual image, so a pornographer could simply defend against a
charge by arguing that the image is virtual) °4  However, the Court
concluded that protected speech could not be limited so as to eliminate
unprotected speech. 10 5 The government pointed to an affirmative defense
within the CPPA that allowed the defendant "to avoid conviction for
nonpossession offenses by showing the materials were produced using only
adults" and it was not pandered as child pornography; the government
argued, essentially, that the burden of proof was simply shifted. 0 6 Aside
from the constitutional concerns with requiring a defendant to prove speech
is protected, the Court concluded that this affirmative defense was
insufficient because it could not be invoked by possessors or by those who
use computer-imaging or other means that do not involve the use of
97. Id.
98. Id. at 253-54.
99. Id. at 254.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 255. In fact, the Court pointed out the opposite may be true. Id. "The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that
protected speech of others may be muted." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
106. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255-56; see 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000). This statute reads:
It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of
subsection (a) that (1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person
or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (2) each such person was an adult at the
time the material was produced; and (3) the defendant did not advertise, promote, present,
describe, or distribute the material in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is
or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Id.
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youthful-looking adults.'0 7 The Court, however, by its language, left open
some possibility that an affirmative defense could be sufficient if properly
drafted.'08
After finding that the "appears to be" provision of § 2256(8)(B) was
overbroad, the Court considered the challenge to § 2256(8)(D).'09 The Court
found that the provision did not consider the content beyond requiring that it
be sexually explicit; it did not even have to involve minors if it was
presented as being of minors." ° The legislature had presented no findings
relating to how images can be harmful simply by being pandered as child
pornography."' The Court stated that, while pandering can be relevant as to
whether something is obscene," 2 § 2256(8)(D) prohibited a substantial
amount of speech that did not fall within that rationale." 3 Possessors of
pandered material could be criminally liable for possession even though they
had no role in how the work was presented; even if the possessor knew the
material was mislabeled, possession would still be a crime."14 The Court
concluded that "[lt]he First Amendment requires a more precise
restriction."' 15
B. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas stated that the best rationale offered for the CPPA was
that prosecutions may be thwarted because virtual child pornography is
indistinguishable, even by experts, from real pornography." 6 He concluded
that, although at that point the government had not shown with facts that this
was a real problem, "technology may evolve to the point where it becomes
impossible to enforce actual child pornography laws.""' 7 In this case, Justice
107. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255-56.
108. Id. at 256 ("Even if an affirmative defense can save a statute from First Amendment
challenge, here the defense is incomplete and insufficient, even on its own terms.").
109. Id. at 257. See supra text accompanying note 77 for the language of the statute.
110. Id. at 257.
11. Id.
112. Id.; see also Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). In Ginzburg, the publications
in question were not themselves obscene. Id. at 465 n.4. Rather, the Court found that the "setting in
which the publications were presented" could be a relevant aid to determining whether a work was
obscene, Id. at 465-66. In considering the setting, the Court determined that the works were
pandered and that "[wihere the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of
his publications, that fact may be decisive in the determination of obscenity." Id. at 470. The Court
was concerned that a work that is presented to appeal to the prurient interest may escape prosecution
by the defendant simply devising some literary, artistic, or scientific value as a pretext. Id.
113. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
117. Id. The government did not point to any cases where a defendant had been acquitted by
claiming the image was virtual. Id.
Thomas concluded that an affirmative defense or "some other narrowly
drawn restriction" may suffice." 8
In response to the Court's conclusion that lawful speech cannot be
suppressed to deter or punish unlawful speech," 9 Justice Thomas countered,
"the Government may well have a compelling interest in barring or
otherwise regulating some narrow category of 'lawful speech' in order to
enforce effectively laws against pornography made through the abuse of real
children."' 2 °  Noting that the Court left open the possibility of a more
complete affirmative defense, Justice Thomas concluded that this contained
the implicit assumption that there may be a constitutional way to regulate
virtual child pornography. 12' Further, he did not necessarily believe that an
affirmative defense was the only constitutional alternative.
122
C. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence and Dissent in Part
In Justice O'Connor's view, there are two categories of virtual child
pornography within the reach of the statute-that which uses youthful-
looking adults and that which is computer generated. 23 Justice O'Connor
agreed with the Court that the prohibition as it applied to youthful-looking
adults was overbroad because there are many materials possessing serious
artistic, literary, or political value that may fall under the statute.
24
However, she concluded that computer-generated virtual child pornography
can be banned. 25  Specifically, she relied on the narrow scope of the
overbreadth doctrine. 126 Justice O'Connor argued that, given the compelling
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
120. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 259.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Section 2256(8)(B) itself does
not make this distinction. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000). However, there are other areas of the
CPPA where this distinction is made. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000). The affirmative defense is
available only for those who are charged in relation to materials made using subjects who are
actually adults. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 267.
124. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 267; see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor
agreed with the majority that these materials would fall within the reach of the CPPA. Ashcroft, 535
U.S. at 262.
125. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 262.
126. Id. Both the majority and Justice O'Connor looked to Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973), for guidance regarding the overbreadth doctrine. Id. at 255. In Broadrick, the Court
concluded that the traditional rules of standing are altered in First Amendment cases-there is no
requirement that the person attacking the statute demonstrate that the statute has been enforced
against him or her in an unconstitutional way. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612. The rationale for this
change in the rules of standing was that the very possibility of enforcement could cause a person to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech. Id. The Court described several different types of
overbreadth challenges: (1) statutes that "by their terms, seek to regulate 'only spoken words,"'
where the Court prefers some speech to go unpunished rather than curb lawful speech; (2) where
rights of association are burdened; (3) and where time, place, and manner restrictions require official
approval under laws that "delegate[] standardless discretionary power to local functionaries,
resulting in virtually unreviewable prior restraints on First Amendment rights." Id. at 612-13. When
the result of these challenges is the state's inability to apply the statute at all unless a limiting
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interest in protecting children that was made clear in Ferber, the
congressional findings that pornographic images "whet the appetites of child
molesters" and that such images can be used to seduce young children
justify the ban. 127 Justice O'Connor was most concerned with the possibility
that prosecutors may not be successful because of a defense that the image is
virtual. 28 Justice O'Connor was especially concerned with "the rapid pace
of advances in computer-graphics technology."' 129 While Justice Thomas
found it dispositive, at least in this particular case, that no defendant had
successfully employed the defense, 3 ° Justice O'Connor was less bothered
by these facts, noting that "this Court's cases do not require Congress to wait
for harm to occur before it can legislate against it.''
In response to the argument that many works that fall outside these
justifications were still within the definition of the statute, and so the statute
was not narrowly tailored, Justice O'Connor argued that a more appropriate
interpretation of the words "appears to be" is "virtually indistinguishable
from."' 132 While sexually explicit cartoons, sketches, or statues may "appear
to be" of minors, these images are not likely to seduce children or produce
difficulties for prosecutors. 33 However, all those works that are "virtually
indistinguishable" from real child pornography surely will pose these
dangers. 34  Justice O'Connor further noted that this interpretation of the
language is consistent with congressional intent and findings. 35  Justice
O'Connor finally noted that, given the narrow nature of the overbreadth
doctrine, it was up to the challengers to show that a "substantial amount of
valuable or harmless speech" would still be threatened with this
interpretation. 36  She concluded that the respondents had provided no
examples of works that had serious value or did not facilitate child abuse
instruction is given, the Court should use the doctrine sparingly because it is "strong medicine." Id.
at 613. The Court held, therefore, that in order to protect the legitimate sweep of a statute, a statute
should not be struck down unless the overbreadth is real and substantial in relation to the legitimate
sweep of the statute, and unless the overbreadth cannot be cured by case-by-case analysis of the facts
or a limiting instruction. Id. at 613, 615-16.
127. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 263 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394
(5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the "mistake of fact" defense); United States v. Vig, 167 F.3d 443 (8th Cir.
1999) (rejecting defendant's argument that the prosecution failed to show the images were of a real
child); United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding no error in refusal to give
jury instructions that they must find the image to be of a real minor).
131. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 264 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. ld.
135. Id.
136. id. at 265.
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under this interpretation.137
D. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred with Justice O'Connor that
"Congress has a compelling interest in ensuring the ability to enforce
prohibitions of actual child pornography" and that the Court should defer to
Congress's findings regarding the coming changes in technology. 38
However, with regard to materials depicting youthful-looking adults, Chief
Justice Rehnquist was convinced that the CPPA "need not be construed to
reach such materials."'
' 39
Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice O'Connor both that
Broadrick should be applied only in limited situations and that, when a
limiting instruction can cure the overbreadth, such an instruction should be
employed rather than striking down the entire statute. 40  With regard to §
2256(8)(B), Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the words "sexually
explicit conduct"'' 4 1 could be construed to reach only the "hard core of child
pornography."'' 42 This way, the majority and Justice O'Connor's concern
over simulated images in works with literary or artistic value could be
cured. 143  When read in this limited way, the CPPA would ban "visual
depictions of youthful-looking adult actors engaged in actual sexual activity;
mere suggestions of sexual activity, such as youthful-looking adult actors
squirming under a blanket, are more akin to written descriptions than visual
depictions and thus would fall outside the purview of the statute."' 44 Chief
Justice Rehnquist found that this understanding of the CPPA is consistent
with congressional intent: the "simulated" in the definition just means that
which is "made to look genuine."' 4  Chief Justice Rehnquist finally
concluded that another strength of this reasoning is that experience proves
this to have been the understanding of the statute. 46  If the makers of
American Beauty and Traffic had been concerned about the reach of the
137. Id. at 266. Justice O'Connor also concurred with the Court that the pandering provision
should be struck down because "the [g]overnment fail[ed] to explain how this ban serves any
compelling state interest." Id. at 262.
138. Id. at 267 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 268. Chief Justice Rehnquist shared Justice O'Connor and the majority's concern that
these types of depictions may have serious literary or artistic value. Id.
140. Id.
141. In 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2), "sexually explicit conduct" is defined as "actual or simulated ...
sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between
persons of the same or opposite sex; . . . bestiality; ... masturbation: ... sadistic or masochistic
abuse; ... or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person." 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)
(2000).
142. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 269 (Rehnquist, C.J.. dissenting).
143. Id. at 269-70.
144. Id. at 269.
145. Id. As evidence of this, the Chief Justice cited United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 72
(1999), Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting), and S. REP. No. 104-358, pt. 1, p.7 (1996). Id.
146. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 271.
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statute, the films "would not have been made the way they were;" rather,
their speech would have been "chilled" by the statute's broad applications.1
47
Chief Justice Rehnquist next considered § 2256(8)(D), concluding that,
like § 2256(8)(B), the provision could be limited so that it would be
constitutional.1 48 "Conveys the impression" could be limited to apply only
to the "sordid business of pandering" that has been found to be without First
Amendment protection. 49  In response to the majority and Justice
O'Connor's argument that even possession by someone who had no role in
the pandering would be punishable, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked to
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 5 ° which requires that possession be
"knowing."'' He concluded that the "knowing" requirement could be
applied here as well, and the CPPA construed to criminalize only "the
knowing possession of materials actually containing visual depictions of real
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, or computer generated images
virtually indistinguishable from real minors engaged in sexually explicit
conduct."'
' 52
In short, Chief Justice Rehnquist thought that, consistent with the
limited nature of the holding in Broadrick, each of the majority's and Justice
O'Connor's concerns with the CPPA could be cured by limiting the reach of
its provisions. 153
E. The Reasoning of the Justices: Considerations and Critique
The crux of the debate between the majority, the concurrences, and the
dissent is two-fold: whether the interests asserted by the government are
sufficient to justify the CPPA and how the scope of the CPPA should be
defined. 54 Justices Thomas and O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist did
not take issue with the proposition that Miller and Ferber do not justify the
CPPA.'55 Rather, they took issue (Justice Thomas to a lesser extent) with
the majority's conclusion that there are no compelling state interests behind
the CPPA besides those advanced in Miller and Ferber.5 6 Although the
asserted interest most persuasive to most Justices was the interest in
prosecuting real child pornography, there are further concerns, unaddressed
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Ginzburg v. United States. 383 U.S. 463, 467 (1966)).
150. United States v. X-Citement Video. Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
151. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 273 (citing X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 77-78).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Ashcroft. 535 U.S. 234.
155. Id. at 259-60, 262, 267-73
156. See id. at 259. 263. 273.
by any of the Justices, with regard to the other interests. 157 Perhaps there are
interests in regulating virtual child pornography aside from its effect on real
pornography; perhaps it is an evil unto itself.158 Whether the other asserted
interests may in fact be compelling is a question that must at least be asked.
1. The Seduction of Children
Only two opinions addressed the seduction of children argument, the
majority's and Justice O'Connor's 59  Perhaps this indicates that this
argument was not taken too seriously. 160 However, the support the majority
offered does not necessarily point to the result. The main basis for the
majority's rejection of the seduction of children argument was Sable
Communications v. FCC.161  In Sable Communications, the government
sought to impose a ban on indecent and obscene interstate commercial
telephone messages, known as "dial-a-porn."' 162 The Court found that there
is a compelling interest in shielding children from "dial-a-porn" messages:
"We have recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors. This interest extends to
shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult
standards."' 163 The problem with the statute in Sable Communications was
not that there was no interest in keeping children from hearing the messages;
rather, it was that the particular statute was not narrowly tailored because it
also shielded adults from the materials completely separate and apart from
the possible reach of children. 64 In Ashcroft, the Court relied on this case to
show that "speech within the rights of adults to hear may not be silenced
completely in an attempt to shield children from it.'
' 65
However, this does not lessen the state's interest in shielding children
from that speech; it simply means the statute must be more narrowly
tailored.166 In Sable Communications, an affirmative defense was suitable
for this purpose. 167  A previous version of the bill at issue in Sable
Communications had allowed the defendant to show, as an affirmative
157. See infra Part II.E. I through II.E.7 for a discussion of the considerations that the Justices did
not address.
158. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 67, at 466 (pointing out that virtual pornography may be more
effective than real pornography in seducing children because it can be customized using pictures of
the child's friends); discussion infra Part II.E.2 (discussing the process by which pedophiles become
socialized to believe that the acquisition and development of pornography is normal).
159. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250-52. Justice O'Connor only mentions it in passing. See id. at 260
(O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
160. See id.
161. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 252.
162. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 118 (1989).
163. Id. at 126.
164. id.
165. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 252.
166. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126 (noting that the government has a compelling
interest in protecting minors, but that the government must do so through "carefully tailored"
means).
167. Id. at 120-21.
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defense, that the defendant restricted access to the messages to adults only in
accordance with FCC procedures. 168  The Court found that the FCC
procedures "were a satisfactory solution to the problem of keeping indecent
dial-a-porn messages out of the reach of minors."'169  Therefore, Sable
Communications seems to stand more for the proposition that an affirmative
defense can cure overbreadth than for the proposition that the interest itself
is not sufficient.
70
The majority further looked to Butler v. Michigan to show that the
state's interest in stopping the seduction of children is not a sufficient
interest to justify the statute. t7' In Butler, the statute in question made it an
offense to make materials that had a potentially harmful influence on minors
available to the general public.172 As in Sable Communications, the Court
found that what adults were permitted to see and hear could not be limited
because of its effect on children.' 73
However, the problem with looking to both Butler and Sable
Communications is that neither truly addresses the harm that concerned the
government and led to the passage of the CPPA. 174 In both Butler and Sable
Communications, the concern seems to be how the materials will affect
children's mental and moral health; the concern is essentially the influence
on children and their minds. 7 5 In Ashcroft, the statute's concern with the
"seduction of children" does not seem to be that children will be exposed to
sex, but that they will be the victims of sex. 17 6 Anne M. Coughlin 77 testified
before the Senate that the nomenclature of
abuse, exploitation, enticement, seduction-is sensible and
balanced, but it does not fully capture the core harm to children that
168. Id.
169. Id. at 128.
170. See id. at 126-28. For example, an affirmative defense that would limit the scope of the
CPPA in this way could require a showing that the materials in question could not be used for the
seduction purpose. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 252 ("The evil in question depends upon the actor's
unlawful conduct."). Justice O'Connor stated that cartoon sketches or statues of children that are
sexually suggestive cannot be used to seduce children. Id. at 264 (O'Connor, J., concurring and
dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor gave no explanation for why this is true. See id. See infro
notes 200-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of this argument.
171. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 252.
172. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 380 (1957).
173. Id. at 383-84.
174. Compare Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126 (noting that there is a legitimate interest in
"protecting children from exposure to indecent dial-a-pom messages") and Butler, 352 U.S. at 383
(noting a governmental concern regarding written materials that might be harmful to children), with
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251.
175. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126; Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
176. See Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting Our Children and the Constitution: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Anne M. Coughlin)
[hereinafter Statement of Anne M. Coughlinl.
177. Anne M. Coughlin is a Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. Id.
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the criminal law here'78 aims to deter and punish. The harm
involved in many of these cases is not merely sexual exploitation or
seduction or (even) abuse. Rather, the harm is rape ... [T]he
people who use pornographic images to convince children to have
sex with them are raping those children. 7 9
When looked at this way, pornography takes the form more of a
weapon-something used to facilitate and make crimes possible-than
something that is merely a negative influence on children.' 80 The children,
no matter what occurs after viewing the material, are not the actors in this
situation.'' Rather, the actors are the adults who victimize them.'82 The
question then becomes whether the government may not only "punish adults
who provide unsuitable materials to children,"'' 83 but also limit adults' access
to and ability to produce "weapons" that consist of speech?
184
The majority, while not addressing this question specifically, answered
it in the negative. 85 The majority wrote, "The evil in question depends upon
the actor's unlawful conduct, conduct defined as criminal quite apart from
any link to the speech in question.' 186  However, the two seem closely
related, especially to the extent that the crime, in some situations, could not
be accomplished without the pornography.'87 That a defendant cannot rely
on the First Amendment when the speech is the vehicle to committing a
crime is a principle apparent in Ferber.88  Additionally, in Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., the Court upheld an injunction against union
members who were picketing against non-union ice peddlers. 89  "[T]he
avowed immediate purpose of the picketing was to compel the [Storage and
Ice Company] to agree to stop selling ice to nonunion peddlers. [The law]
make[s] such an agreement a crime. ' 90 In response to the union members'
First Amendment challenge to this action, the Court held that "constitutional
freedom for speech and press [does not extend] its immunity to speech or
writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute." 9 Surely a tool or weapon of a crime is an "integral part" of the
178. This reference is to an amendment to the CPPA, which is discussed in greater detail in Part
IlIl.A, infra.
179. Statement of Anne M. Coughlin, supra note 176.
180. See id. This, of course, is accepting governmental findings that such seductions can and do
occur. See, e.g., I A'r'Y GEN. COMM. ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REP. 649 (1986).
181. See Statement of Anne M. Coughlin, supra note 176.
182. See id.
183. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 251-52 (2003).
184. See id.
185. Id. at 252.
186. Id.
187. See Statement of Anne M. Coughlin, supra note 176; 1 ATr'Y GEN. COMM. ON
PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REP. 649 (1986).
188. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1982).
189. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
190. Id. at 492.
191. Id. at 498.
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crime. 192 If the picketing in Giboney was integral enough to the crime of
restraining trade to warrant such a statement by the Court, the analogy is
probably close enough to show that virtual child pornography can also be an
integral weapon in the rape of children. 93
The majority's disposition of the seduction of children argument also
seems in conflict with the Court's reasoning in Osborne. In Osborne, the
Court accepted the seduction of children argument as legally viable even if
insufficient in itself to justify the anti-possession statute.' 94 However, in
Ashcroft, the Court took issue with the viability, not the sufficiency, of the
interest. 95 It seems like, at the very least, the Court should have addressed
its reasoning in Osborne and explained why it does not apply in this
context. 196 The Court in Ashcroft even acknowledged earlier in its opinion
that Osborne recognizes the seduction argument. 197  However, the Court
then ignored Osborne and argued that the seduction reasoning limits what
adults can see and hear.' 98 The Court's failure to directly address Osborne
seems to substantially weaken the credibility of its reasoning.' 99
Further, Justice O'Connor justified her reading of the language "appears
to be" to mean "virtually indistinguishable from" in part on the ground that
some works that are distinguishable from real child pornography cannot be
used to "seduce" children.2° ° She was thinking of works such as cartoon-
192. See id.
193. Compare id. (allowing the state to proscribe speech which is being used as an "integral part"
of a plan to illegally restrain trade) with Statement of Anne M. Coughlin, supra note 176 (asserting
that child pornography is used to commit rape). Of course, this argument has weaknesses, too. First,
in Giboney, there was no statute that sought to make picketing itself illegal because of its potential to
interfere with commerce, whereas in the case of the CPPA, the regulation is aimed at the speech, not
the effect of the speech. Compare Gibonev, 336 U.S. at 491, with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(8)(B), (D)
(2000). Picketing, however, is an activity or speech that may have many legitimate purposes that
would be affected by such a regulation, while there is little or no value in child pornography, real or
virtual. See Giboney, 336 U.S. at 494 (noting that the picketers argued their purpose was to improve
labor conditions); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762. The lack of value in child pornography points to the
conclusion that it can only be used for one purpose: a criminal purpose. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
To that extent, the speech is much more part and parcel of the crime than picketing was in Gibonev.
See id. Second, the majority in Ashcroft pointed out that "[t]here are many things innocent in
themselves ... such as cartoons, video games, and candy, that might be used for immoral purposes,"
but that these things are not made illegal because of this potential. Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 251 (2002). The difference, however, between child pornography and
candy, and the role it plays in the abuse of children is, again, the presence or absence of a legitimate
purpose. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762. An adult can give candy to a child with no criminal purpose.
However, it is hard to fathom a legitimate reason why an adult would show pornography to a child.
194. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
195. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250-54.
196. Id. (discussing why the interest is not compelling without any mention of Osborne).
197. Id. at 250.
198. Id. at 252-53.
199. See id. at 250-54.
200. Id. at 264 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
sketches and statues. 1  It seems true that there is little justification for
criminalizing cartoon-sketches and statues; they pose no prosecutorial
problems, their lack of realism probably makes them less attractive to
pedophiles, and they are not exchanged in a general market for child
pornography.2 2  However, they probably can be used to lower the
inhibitions of children, just as realistic pictures can.20 3  Children are
especially drawn to cartoons and items that look like toys, and therefore the
seduction argument seems to apply to cartoons and statues as well as
pictures. 204 However, because this is a very narrow class of materials, its
criminalization could probably be limited to criminalizing actual use.20 5
2. Whets the Appetites of Pedophiles
The next argument, that child pornography, whether real or virtual,
whets the appetites of pedophiles and increases their propensity to abuse
206children, imposes a large hurdle for the government to clear: ever since
Roth, the propensity of obscenity to increase a certain type of action has not
been the justification for regulating obscenity or pornography.2 7 In
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, this argument was specifically
rejected.20 8 In American Booksellers, the Seventh Circuit refused to uphold
a local ordinance regulating pornography that exhibited women in positions
of subordination on the basis that such pornography increases violence
against women and negatively influences society's images of women.20 9
Although the state's interest in protecting children may be higher than its
interest in protecting women because of children's special vulnerability,
regulations of obscenity or indecency are not upheld explicitly because of
their propensity to influence conduct.
210
However, just because courts do not use this concept as a justification
does not mean that no court could. With more specific factual findings, a
sufficient causal link between pornography and illegal conduct may be
developed.2 1' Dennis v. United States contains the proposition that the
201. Id.
202. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000), Cong. Findings 1-13 (outlining the purposes of criminalizing
virtual child pornography).
203. Jason Baruch, Comment, Constitutional Law: Permitting Virtual Child Pornography-A
First Amendment Requirement, Bad Policy, or Both?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1073, 1077-78 (2003).
204. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251 (noting that pedophiles may use many materials, including
cartoons, video games, and candy for "immoral purposes").
205. See supra Part ILE. A (discussing why, for much virtual child pornography, prohibiting the
conduct it leads to may not be sufficient).
206. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
208. Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cit. 1985).
209. Id. at 327-30.
210. See id. at 328-30 ("If the fact that speech plays a role in a process of conditioning were
enough to permit governmental regulation, that would be the end of freedom of speech."). The court
looked at unpopular political ideas and religions and noted that all of these ideas necessarily have
some impact on conduct. Id.
211. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253-54 (2003).
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gravity of the evil can offset the probability of the evil: the more evil the
harm is, the less probable it must be.' 1 2 In Dennis, speech was punished in
light of a communist conspiracy. 213  Even though the Court found that the
likelihood of success of a communist conspiracy to overthrow the
government was small, the gravity of the danger offset that fact, therefore
allowing the speech to be proscribed.1 4 The analogy is clear: rape and
abuse of children is such a great evil that perhaps less of a showing of actual
causation of the harm may be permitted.1 5
Further, the harm is greater with virtual child pornography than with
obscenity.2 16 With obscenity, the concern is the corruption of the morals of
society or the general perversion of sexuality.2 17 With both virtual child
pornography and real child pornography, the harm is specific: the rape of
children.2 18 Rather than requiring the danger to be "clear and present," the
gravity of the potential harm may allow speech to be punished when the
harm is just probable or intended. 19
There is some evidence that there is a strong connection between child
pornography and child molestation. In one "study of convicted child
molesters, 77% of those who molested boys and 87% of those who molested
girls admitted to the habitual use of pornography in the commission of their
crimes. 22 °  Additionally, there is some evidence that rather than child
212. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) ("'In each case (courts) must ask whether
the gravity of the "evil" discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger' . . . We adopt this statement of the rule." (quoting Chief Judge
Learned Hand)). Additionally, it does not matter whether the speech is evidence of a crime or the
speech itself is made unlawful. Id. at 506.
213. Id. at 509-10.
214. Seeid. at509-11.
215. See id.
216. Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), with Statement of Anne M.
Coughlin, supra note 176.
217. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 485; see also Lockhart & McClure, supra note 34, at 329-31 (noting
that, prior to Miller, obscenity was determined in connection with that which has the "tendency to
suggest impure and libidinous thoughts," "suggest[s] lewd thoughts and excit[es] sensual desires,"
and "stirfs] the sexual impulses").
218. Statement of Anne M. Coughlin, supra note 176.
219. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509-11 (outlining a balancing-type test for determining if potentially
harmful speech may be proscribed on that basis).
220. DONNA RICE HUGHES, How PORNOGRAPHY HARMS CHILDREN: PROTECTING CHILDREN IN
CYBERSPACE, at http://www.protectkids.com/effects/harms.htm (2001); accord S. REP. No. 104-
358, at 13 (1996) (quoting psychiatrist Dr. Victor Cline as saying "the overwhelming majority...
use child pornography and/or create it to stimulate and whet their sexual appetites"). Contra
JENKINS, supra note 68. Professor Jenkins notes that although a substantial number of child
molesters are caught with child pornography, there are a vast number of users of child pornography
who are never caught by law enforcement. Id. at 127-28. Accordingly, it is impossible to know
what actual percentage of people who use child pornography also molest children. Id. Jenkins also
notes that on on-line bulletin boards frequented by pedophiles many speak out against child
molestation. Id. at 129. Notwithstanding the pedophiles' inability to see their use of child
pornography itself as abuse of children, this anecdotal evidence may work against a conclusion that
consumers of child pornography necessarily act on their desires. See id.
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pornography causing child molestation-surely pedophilia, whatever its
causes, is that which causes child molestation-the drive to acquire more
child pornography (also caused by pedophilia) may encourage pedophiles to
create their own "original" pornography.12 The on-line culture of those who
"collect" child pornography "is driven by the quest for new material, the
urge to complete collections. ' 2  Thus, pedophiles create pornography in
order to acquire pornography, rather than for profit. 223 If experts cannot tell
the difference between real and virtual child pornography, perhaps
pedophiles cannot either.224 Perhaps pedophiles, in their drive to acquire
what they believe to be real pornography, may create some real pornography
of their own.225 In addition, there is a "broad public consensus" that accepts
the assertion that child pornography causes crime, some even going so far as
to conclude that it is a "direct stimulus to child abduction or murder.,
226
Furthermore, pedophiles who regularly engage in the on-line exchange
of child pornography become socialized.227 Through the exchange of child
pornography with others, they begin to feel that they are normal. 28
Professor Jenkins notes that
[i]n the case of electronic porn, this tendency may be reinforced by
a kind of desensitization, a hunger for ever more illegal material.
While a novice [someone new to looking at and collecting child
pornography] might be amazed and stimulated by the first few soft-
core pornographic images, these are all too likely to become
routine, and one turns avidly to harder-core sites.229
The methodology that Professor Jenkins used in reaching these
conclusions did not involve actually looking at any child pornography.23 °
Therefore, Professor Jenkins would be unable to conclude whether the
pornography that is exchanged is real or virtual. 2 1 But whether real or
virtual, it would seem that it can have the same effect of socializing the
pedophile, suppressing his own inhibitions and shame over his behavior, and
encouraging him to turn to more and more violent images.232 Accordingly,
the creation of real child pornography, and therefore the abuse of children, is
221. JENKINS, supra note 68, at 105.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000), Cong. Finding 5 (finding that virtual child pornography is
"virtually indistinguishable" from real child pornography).
225. JENKINS, supra note 68, at 105.
226. Id. at 4-5.
227. Id. at 107-09.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 109.
230. Id. at 18-20 (stating that the book is based on textual material found in newsgroups, message
boards, etc.).
231. See id.
232. See id. at 109.
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encouraged. 33 Professor Jenkins's research also brings to light the idea that
child pornography, for the pedophile, is an end unto itself, not just a means
to child molestation.2 34 Perhaps it is easier to accept the proposition that
looking at virtual child pornography may cause the creation of real
pornography than it is to accept the argument that there is an initial causal
connection between looking at pornography and molesting children to
gratify a whetted appetite.235
In Dennis, the Court was concerned with the conspirators' intent to
overthrow the government. 236 Likewise, intent to cause harm to children can
be inferred in many cases involving the creation of virtual or real child
pornography.23 7 It is a common presumption of both civil and criminal law
"that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his
voluntary actions. '238 The creators of child pornography, real or virtual, can
surely foresee that pedophiles, and no one else, will have any interest in their
work. Creators of child pornography, both real and virtual, are presumably
aware that pedophiles regularly abuse children. As discussed above, the fact
that pedophiles encourage each other to post "original" pornography on the
239internet supports this notion.  Perhaps, in some situations, intent to bring
about harm can be inferred.24 ° If intent can be established, as it was in
Dennis, it may be sufficient to justify regulating the speech.24'
The majority did not consider Dennis at all in its analysis.2 42 Rather, it
relied on other cases that require a clear causal connection to be shown.2 43
In both cases that the Court cited, Hess v. Indiana244 and Brandenburg v.
Ohio,245 the required degree of causal connection between the speech and the
crime was not determined. Though it was clear that the crime could not be
233. Seeid. at 105.
234. See id.
235. See id.; Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
236. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) ("It has been suggested that the
presence of intent makes a difference in the law when an 'act otherwise excusable or carrying minor
penalties' is accompanied by such an evil intent.").
237. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982) (finding that "the distribution of
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual
abuse of children ....").
238. Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278 (1979) (rejecting the
principle in the particular context of that case).
239. See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
241. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509 ("Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force,
even though doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists,
is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent." (emphasis added)).
242. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 239-58 (2002).
243. See id. at 253-54.
244. 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
245. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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committed at "some indefinite future time,"2 46 the majority just concluded
that the government could only suppress speech that "'is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action.' ' 247 There was no discussion as to
how strong the correlation must be, only the statement that a "more direct
connection" than had been shown was required. 248 The majority, therefore,
failed to give much direction to lawmakers as to whether further fact finding
may cure the problems or whether the majority, by its lack of direction, was
indicating its lack of openness to the idea altogether.249
3. Need to Eliminate the Market for Real Pornography
If this argument 250 were to be accepted, then the Ferber rationale would
apply: real children would be harmed, and that would be a sufficient
justification for the regulation.5 What is most difficult about this argument
is that it seems somewhat impossible to prove. If the illegal trade of real
pornography were to increase, how could it be demonstrated that this
occurred because of the increase in virtual child pornography? It seems, as
the Court concluded, "implausible. 2 52 It is perhaps for this reason that the
majority declined to look at any case or consider any factual contention that
had been submitted by the government in support of its rejection of this
argument.2 53  The majority looked only to Bartnicki v. Vopper2t4 for the
proposition that the market deterrence interest does not apply in all cases.255
The majority also relied briefly on Ferber and Osborne for the idea that
there should be some underlying crime that the government seeks to deter by
eliminating the market. 56 However, the Court concluded that, in this case,
"there is no underlying crime at all.' 257 In other words, the creation of
virtual child pornography is not, in and of itself, criminal, unlike the creation
of real child pornography.258 Of course, the argument is that the underlying
crime is the creation of real child pornography, which is encouraged or
enabled by virtual child pornography.259 Meanwhile, the concurrences and
dissents did not address this argument at all. 260 Apparently, it was not the
246. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253 (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)).
247. Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
251. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759-60 (1982). The market deterrence theory was
accepted in Osborne as necessary to eliminate real child pornography. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 109-10 (1990).
252. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 254.
253. See id. at 253-54.
254. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
255. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 254.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
260. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 260-67 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part); id. at 267-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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basis for their conclusion that there is a compelling interest in regulating
virtual child pornography.
2 6 1
However, one possibility that the Court did not consider is that the
production of real child pornography becomes more likely to occur when
considered in conjunction with the government's argument that prosecution
of pornographers becomes more difficult.262 If the indistinguishability of
virtual and real child pornography makes prosecution more difficult, and
pornographers, through the legality of virtual pornography have something
of a built-in defense to child pornography charges, then the risk of producing
real child pornography goes down.263 If criminal punishments are the main
deterrent of the creation, distribution, and possession of child pornography,
and these punishments become less likely, then the creation of real child
pornography may in fact increase.2 4
This argument, of course, makes several factual assumptions. First, it
assumes that pornographers have the option of producing real child
pornography. As it is, many pornographers may make virtual child
pornography because they do not have access to children. This can be
inferred because, until recently, both types of pornography were illegal (and
obscene virtual child pornography is still illegal). 265 Therefore, there was no
less risk in producing or possessing virtual child pornography than in
producing or possessing real child pornography. 66 However, the Court
made this same factual assumption.267  The Court discounted the
government's argument because "few pornographers would risk prosecution
by abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would suffice. 268
One final angle to the market-deterrence argument is that collectors of
child pornography themselves do not necessarily know whether they are in
possession of real or virtual pornography. 269 This conclusion is inferred
from the government's claim that even experts have difficulty telling the
difference between real and virtual pictures.27 ° If that is the case, pedophiles
do not necessarily know the difference either; only the pedophile that made
261. See id.
262. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
263. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 263 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
264. See id.
265. See id. at 258.
266. See id.
267. Id. at 254.
268. Id. Additionally, the market-deterrence/prosecution argument, in spite of its intuitive sense,
suffers from the same deficiency from which the "whets the appetite" argument suffers: there is no
clear causation. Furthermore, in order for it to be at all persuasive, the "hinders prosecution"
argument must be accepted. Therefore, the market-deterrence argument does not provide a
completely independent justification for the CPPA's regulation of speech.
269. 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000), Cong. Finding 5.
270. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 254.
the picture knows."' The idea that pedophiles do not make a sharp
distinction between real and virtual pictures lends credence to the
government's finding that virtual and real pictures are often exchanged for
each other.272 This conclusion may especially be true in light of the fact that,
in some circumstances, virtual child pornography may be preferable to real
pornography in that it allows the creator to make it "custom" to fit his
preferences.273 While the Court concluded that pedophiles might choose
virtual child pornography because it would be legally safer,274 the picture
that the government paints is one of a holistic problem, in which the only
place where a distinction between real and virtual pictures exists is in the
courts.
2 7 5
4. Hinders Prosecution
This argument was the most persuasive to Justices Thomas and
O'Connor and to Chief Justice Rehnquist.276 In each opinion, however, the
concurring or dissenting Justice who was persuaded by the argument failed
to offer any real explanation for why he or she found the argument
persuasive, or at least more persuasive than the others.277 Justice Thomas
simply remarked that that government "may well have a compelling
interest" in barring some speech to punish other speech, but he did not look
to a single case for support.278 Justice O'Connor concluded that this
argument was of "even more serious concern" than the other concerns
expressed by the government, but looked to a case only to counter Justice
Thomas' concern that the defense had not been successfully employed.279
She did not cite any precedent to show that enabling prosecution is a
compelling governmental interest in other contexts. 280 Finally, Chief Justice
Rehnquist also concluded that "Congress has a compelling interest in
ensuring the ability to enforce prohibitions of actual child pornography,"
and, apparently in response to Justice Thomas, that the Court should defer to
Congress's finding that advancing technology will inhibit prosecutions.28'
271. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) ("To a pedophile who is seeking or
disseminating child pornography, or a child molester using pornographic images of child sexuality,
or to a child who is being seduced by images of children engaged in sexual conduct, they can neither
tell, nor would they care, if the images are real or manufactured, so long as they appear real.").
272. See id. (testimony of Bruce A. Taylor).
273. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 16(1996).
274. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 254.
275. See id.
276. See supra notes 117-20, 128-31, 138 and accompanying text.
277. For a discussion of the persuasiveness of this argument, see infra notes 291-95 and
accompanying text.
278. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
279. Id. at 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (citing Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997), to show that Congress does not have to wait for the harm
to occur).
280. See id.
281. Id. at 267 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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However, he also failed to look to any precedent to show that the
government has a compelling interest in ensuring prosecutions.
82
It is in fact relevant that the Justices did not look to precedent in this
context. This asserted interest is the one most addressed by the dissenting
and concurring Justices, and, therefore, the one most in need of support.283
In addition, the support is also needed to counter the arguments made by the
majority. 284 Granted, the majority looked only to Broadrick, but it was for a
proposition that appears to apply in this situation: that "[t]he possible harm
to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be
muted .... ,,28 Therefore, punishing protected speech in order to deter
unprotected speech "turns the First Amendment upside down. 286
The problem with the majority's reliance on Broadrick is that the
statement to which the majority looks only supports and describes the
overbreadth doctrine.287 It establishes the principle that allows overbreadth
challenges-that a law may not capture speech it has no right to capture.
288
However, the statement in Broadrick does not assume the factual situation at
issue here: that the protected speech is interfering with the ability to punish
the unprotected speech, that there may be spurious claims by defendants that
their speech falls into the protected category when in fact it belongs in the
unprotected, or that it is impossible to distinguish between protected and
unprotected speech. 289 Broadrick, therefore, offers a general proposition but
not one that is nearly specific enough to address the interest actually asserted
here.29°
It seems that the case that best supports the argument that the hindering
of prosecutions is a compelling governmental interest is Ferber.29 1  If
prosecutors cannot convict creators, distributors, or possessors of real child
pornography because of its resemblance to virtual child pornography, real
children are harmed.292 Part of the reason for such prosecutions is to deter
282. See id.
283. See supra notes 117-20, 128-31, 138 and accompanying text.
284. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 254-55.
285. Id. at 255.
286. Id.
287. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,612 (1973).
288. See id. at 611 ("It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space
and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be
narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment .... ").
289. See id. at 605-08 (noting that Broadrick involved a challenge to a statute that restricted the
public, political activities of civil servants which set out "plain" and "explicit" standards regarding
what activities were permitted and not permitted).
290. See id. at 612.
291. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 262-64, 269-73 and accompanying text.
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and punish the creation of child pornography.293 If the deterrence and
punishment do not occur, children who are victims of real child pornography
go without vindication for the wrongs committed against them,9 and, as
discussed above, the creators of real child pornography can continue
unabated.295
Additionally, the Court has allowed the criminalization of non-speech
activities as a mere means of enforcing congressional objectives.296 In Perez
v. United States, the Court, in order to eliminate organized crime, allowed a
loan-sharking statute, passed under the Commerce Clause, to be applied to a
defendant who had participated in loan-sharking only intrastate.297  The
Court concluded that "'[w]hen it is necessary [for Congress] in order to
prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise thing to be
prevented it may do so."' 298 Of course, Perez did not involve a person's
First Amendment rights or an activity that would otherwise be protected.299
However, Perez did involve a person's freedom, and it made a person liable
under federal law for activities for which he would not otherwise have been
liable.30 0  Thus, Perez, at least loosely, stands for the proposition that the
government's interest in stamping out crime may extend to otherwise legal
activities.3 ° t
5. Affirmative Defense
A final argument regarding § 2256(8)(B) is that the affirmative defense,
which allowed the defendant to show that the material was made using only
adults and that it was not pandered, makes the CPPA not a "measure
suppressing speech but ... a law shifting the burden to the accused to prove
the speech is lawful., 30 2 The majority did not look to a single case to justify
its conclusion that there are "serious constitutional difficulties" in requiring
the defendant to prove that "his speech is not unlawful," and then claimed
that the Court need not decide the question.30 3 The Court's assertion of
constitutional difficulties flies in the face of Sable Communications, where
the Court found that an affirmative defense could save the statute from
293. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982) ("[T]he most expeditious if not the only
practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing
severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product.").
294. See id. at 760 n.10 (discussing the long-lasting detrimental impacts of the creation of child
pornography using real children on the children who were used to make the pornography).
295. See supra notes 271-75 and accompanying text.
296. See Perez v. United States, 407 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that intrastate activities that cannot
normally be regulated by Congress are nonetheless subject to federal power because of their effects
on interstate commerce).
297. Id. at 146-47, 155.
298. Id. at 154 (quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927) (Holmes, J.)).
299. Id. at 146 (noting that the conviction in question was for loan-sharking).
300. Id. at 154-57.
301. See id.
302. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2003).
303. Id.
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constitutional difficulties.3° In Sable Communications, previous versions of
the challenged statutes had provided an affirmative defense wherein the
defendant could show that measures had been taken to limit access to the
dial-a-porn messages to adults.30 5 This affirmative defense was similar to
the defense to the CPPA: it was a defense that limited the scope of the
statute only to the interests that it sought to protect.30 6 Just as the affirmative
defenses mentioned in Sable Communications limited the reach of the statute
to people who provided access to messages to children, the affirmative
defense to the CPPA sought to limit the reach of the statute to virtual
pornography rather than pornography using youthful-looking adults that had
not been pandered.30 7
Notwithstanding the Court's objection to the affirmative defense as a
concept, Justice Thomas concluded that the Court left an affirmative defense
open as a possibility, but he offered no guidance as to what an appropriate
affirmative defense might look like.30 8 Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice
Rehnquist chose not to address the issue at all. 30 9 Therefore, in determining
what a constitutional version of the CPPA may look like, the possibility of
an affirmative defense is something to be considered, but that will be
difficult to design.3"0 What a constitutional regulation of virtual child
pornography may look like is discussed below.31' As the provisions change,
the burden of any given showing may be shifted to the defendant in the form
of an affirmative defense.31 2
6. Standard of Review
In each of the opinions, the Justices implicitly applied strict scrutiny.3 3
For content-based regulations, strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of
review, requiring the government to show a compelling governmental
304. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 120-23 (1989). The version of the
statute that was challenged eliminated the affirmative defenses. Id. at 122-23.
305. Id. at 121-22.
306. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2) (repealed) (affirmative defense in Sable Communications),
with 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)(c) (2000) (affirmative defense in Ashcroft).
307. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(C) (2000) (amended following Ashcroft).
308. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
309. Id. at 260-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part); see id. at 267-73 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
310. See id. at 255 (stating that "[t]he Government raises serious constitutional difficulties by
seeking to impose on the defendant the burden of proving his speech is not unlawful," but then
refusing to decide whether the government might be permitted to do so and in what circumstances).
311. See infra Part III.B.
312. See infra Part III.B.
313. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part); id. at 257 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The majority did not
address the level of scrutiny at all, but it seems that, if they were applying a lesser standard, it is
likely that they would have said as much.
interest that is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.31 4 Content-based
regulations are those which, "by their terms[,] distinguish favored speech
from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed.
31 5
Beyond that definition, it is difficult to discern which laws favor or disfavor
speech: while the CPPA may disfavor child pornography as compared with
other sexual speech, it does not discriminate against views expressed within
the category of child pornography.3 6 By contrast, laws that are content-
neutral are subject only to intermediate scrutiny, meaning they must serve a
substantial governmental interest and they may not unreasonably limit
alternative avenues of communication.3 7 Laws that are aimed at the
secondary effects of speech, rather than its content, may be characterized as
content-neutral.3 8
An argument can be made that the CPPA is content-neutral and
therefore more properly the subject of intermediate scrutiny.319 Perhaps, had
the majority so concluded, they could have found the asserted interests to be
substantial enough to pass this level of review.32 ° The district court in
Ashcroft concluded that the CPPA was in fact content-neutral.321 Judge
Conti concluded that "the CPPA is designed to counteract the effect that
such materials has [sic] on its viewers, on children, and to society as a
whole, and is not intended to regulate or outlaw the ideas themselves., 322 To
some extent, the CPPA seems like the law at issue in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc.323 In City of Renton, a local ordinance prohibited
any "adult motion picture theater" from locating within 1000 feet of
residential areas, churches, parks, or schools. 324 The Court concluded that
the purpose of the statute was to "prevent crime, protect the city's retail
trade, [and] maintain property values," all effects of the statute unrelated to
the content of the speech.325 Likewise, the CPPA was designed to prevent
secondary effects of child pornography: seduction of children, expansion of
314. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
315. Id. at 643.
316. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (allowing ordinance
prohibiting operation of adult movie theater and explaining that "the regulation of the places where
sexually explicit films may be exhibited is unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical
message a film may be intended to communicate").
317. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642; City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41, 47 (1986).
318. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
319. See, e.g., Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, No. C 97-0281VSC, 1997 WL 487758, *4 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 12, 1997).
320. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002) (identifying Congress's
asserted reasons for passing the law). However, Justice Kennedy, in his majority opinion in
Ashcroft, concluded that the Court would had to have found that virtual child pornography was an
entirely separate category of unprotected speech in order to uphold the statute. Id. at 246. It is not
clear whether the Court even considered applying the content-neutrality test in this context. See id.
321. Free Speech Coalition, 1997 WL 487758, at *4.
322. Id.
323. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
324. Id. at 44.
325. ld. at 48.
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the market for child pornography, and, most importantly, difficulties in
prosecution.326 Arguably, the government is not targeting virtual child
pornography because of its content, but because of the effects of the
material.327  The government also does not distinguish between differences
in content that can be characterized more broadly as virtual child
pornography; it simply criminalizes speech about child sexuality, regardless
of what it actually says, because of the effects of such speech. 328  The
problem with this approach, however, lies in the language of the statute
itself, a statute that exactly describes the content of the speech that is to be
regulated.329 While City of Renton did not allow the exhibition of prohibited
materials, 330 the CPPA is instead aimed at production, 33' which is inherently
more closely tied to content than to exhibition. Also, the CPPA follows
statutes such as the one in Ferber, which rested on content-based,
categorical prohibitions of speech.332 Additionally, no circuit court that has
heard the case has found that the CPPA is content-neutral.333
The Court may very well have concluded that the CPPA is content-
neutral, but in the end it sprung from a line of cases all of which assume that
child pornography statutes are content-based. 3  The fact that the statute is
aimed at secondary effects does not change that the means through which it
accomplishes those effects is content-discriminatory.335 Additionally, the
Court would not necessarily have concluded that the interests asserted by the
government met the content-neutrality test.3 36  With regard to each of the
asserted interests, the Court was not concerned so much with their severity
326. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000), Cong. Findings 1-13.
327. See id.
328. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002) (explaining that pictures in a
psychology manual could fall into the statute's prohibitions).
329. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D) (2000).
330. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 43.
33 I. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000), Cong. Findings 6-7.
332. See Matthew K. Wegner, Note. Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks: Why Traditional Free
Speech Doctrine Supports Anti-Child-Pornography Regulations in Virtual Realit', 85 MINN. L. REV.
2081,2114-15 (2001) (analyzing the content-neutrality doctrine and its application to the CPPA).
333. See United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61. 68 (Ist Cir. 1999) ("Blanket suppression of an
entire type of speech is by its very nature a content-discriminating act."); United States v. Fox, 248
F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding the CPPA after applying strict scrutiny); United States v.
Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 918 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding the CPPA after applying strict scrutiny);
United States v. Acheson. 195 F.3d 645. 650 (1 lth Cir. 1999) (upholding the CPPA after applying
strict scrutiny); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1999) (striking down
the CPPA after applying strict scrutiny).
334. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. 535 U.S. 234, 249-50 (2002) (analyzing New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). and Osborne v. Ohio. 495 U.S. 103 (1990)).
335. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (striking down law that did not allow picketing
within 150 feet of a school unless it was peaceful labor picketing).
336. See Ashcroft. 535 U.S. at 246 (noting that, in order to uphold the law, the Court would have
to find virtual child pornography was unprotected speech).
857
or compelling nature as it was that they were not factually supportable.337
The Court apparently reasoned that if the government cannot show, for
instance, that child pornography whets the appetites of pedophiles and leads
to more crime against children as a matter of fact, this asserted interest is not
supportable as compelling or substantial, no matter what test is applied. 338
Another possible alternative to strict scrutiny is a balancing test. 339 In
his dissent from the Ninth Circuit majority opinion, Judge Ferguson
concluded that "the proper mode of analysis is to weigh the state's interest in
regulating child pornography against the material's limited social value.,
340
Judge Ferguson concluded that, in both Ferber and Osborne, a balancing test
was used. 34I Additionally, the language of Miller points to a balancing test;
the Miller Court concluded that obscenity is unprotected because it is of
"such slight social value" that any benefit "is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.' 342 Therefore, in those cases where the
Court has concluded that a type of speech is wholly without First
Amendment protection, it has done so using a balancing test.343 This test
seems especially appropriate given that the predecessors of the CPPA also
used this test.344 In addition, the CPPA applies to a type of speech that is
without much value.345 Judge Ferguson concluded, after using the balancing
test, that virtual child pornography should be a category of unprotected
speech.346 The interests asserted by the government and the reasons for
passing the statute outweighed the minimal value of the speech.347
Despite the viability of the balancing test as an option, the majority
barely took notice of it.348 Justice Kennedy acknowledged Judge Ferguson's
conclusion that virtual child pornography should be regarded as a category
of speech wholly without value and concluded that "[iut would be necessary
for us to take this step to uphold the statute. ' ' 349  However, he never
337. E.g., Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253 ("The government has shown no more than a remote
connection between speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child
abuse.").
338. See id. at 254-55 ("Without a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government
may not prohibit speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal
conduct.").
339. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1101 (1999) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1973).
343. See id.
344. See Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1101 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
345. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982) (asserting that "[t]he value of permitting
live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis"). See also Wade T. Anderson, Comment, Criminalizing
"Virtual" Child Pornography Under the Child Pornography Prevention Act: Is it Really What it
"Appears to Be?," 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 393, 418-21 (2001), for an explanation as to why a balancing
test is appropriate.
346. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1101 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
347. Id.
348. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249-58 (2002).
349. Id. at 246.
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explained why the majority chose not to take that step. °50 He merely moved
on to explain that the CPPA did not require obscenity.35' Perhaps the reason
was that, according to the majority's view of the scope of the statute, so
much material with serious artistic, literary, or scientific value would be
prohibited that it could not be seen as a category of speech wholly without
value.352
Given the multiple possibilities pertaining to the proper test to be
applied-strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or a balancing test-it would
have been appropriate for the majority to address the subject.3 53 Also, given
the strength and scholarly support for the balancing test argument, 354 it
would be helpful to know why the Court chose not to apply it. After
resolving the question of the constitutionality of the CPPA, it is still a
mystery why the Court chose strict scrutiny.3 55 The Court's conviction that
the CPPA captured materials of value seems to be the most viable
explanation.3 56
7. Scope of the CPPA
The majority focused much of its opinion on why the foregoing interests
were not sufficient to support the CPPA.357 The majority spent almost no
time justifying its reading of the language of the CPPA to include so much
material with literary, artistic, and scientific value.358 At the same time,
Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist quickly stated, without
explaining why, that the foregoing interests were sufficient, and then
focused their attention on the scope of the CPPA and how its terms should
be construed.359 In this sense, the majority and dissenters are like two ships
passing: each Justice gave relatively little direct response to the disagreeing
Justices' conclusions. However, how the terms of the CPPA are construed
is integral to whether the statute in fact applies only to child pornography or
360to a whole host of materials, the banning of which serves no interest.
350. See id.
351. Id.
352. See id. at 241 (noting that the literal terms of the statute prohibit Renaissance paintings of
classical mythology and some Hollywood movies).
353. See supra notes 314-18, 339-43 and accompanying text.
354. See Adam J. Wasserman, Virtual.Child.Porn.Com: Defending the Constitutionality of the
Criminalization of Computer-Generated Child Pornography by the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996-A Reply to Professor Burke and Other Critics, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 245, 274-78
(1998).
355. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246.
356. See id.
357. See id. at 249-58.
358. See id.
359. Id. at 259-60, 263-66 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part); id. at 267-73
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
360. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 267-69 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (construing the statute
859
The "appears to be" provision was questioned by the majority, Justice
O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.361 The majority read the language
broadly, speculating that by its "literal terms" the statute could include a
"Renaissance painting depicting a scene from classical mythology." 362 The
majority did not explain why the statute should be read to include works that
Congress probably, if not obviously, did not intend to include in the statute's
scope.363 The statute clearly was not aimed at Renaissance paintings or
Hollywood films, 364 but the majority concluded that the only limiter of the
statute would be the jury.365 It is hard to imagine a broader reading of the
statute.366
At the same time, the reading of the statute does make some logical
sense. If the statute was construed so as not to reach any works with literary,
artistic, or social value, obscene works are basically the only things that
would remain.367 Chief Justice Rehnquist sought to limit the statute to
"hard-core" pornographic works by use of the "sexually-explicit" language,
and the result is that it is hard to imagine any work within this reading that
would not be obscene.368 The majority recognized that "the apparent age of
persons engaged in sexual conduct is relevant to whether a depiction offends
community standards. 369 Most communities probably find sexually explicit
images of children without any additional value to be offensive; it is likely
that the only people who have any interest in them are pedophiles.37 °
However, the statute was not intended to reach only obscene images.
3 71
The majority reasonably concluded that the CPPA is like the law in
Ferber.3 72  Additionally, obscene materials are proscribed in a separate
statute.373 Therefore, for the Court to have concluded that the CPPA reaches
narrowly in order to avoid reaching movies such as American Beaun, and Traffic).
361. Id. at 241-42; id. at 262-66 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part); id. at 267-71
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 241.
363. See id.
364. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000), Cong. Finding 1.
365. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241.
366. See id.
367. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining obscenity by reference to literary,
social, or artistic value).
368. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 269 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
369. Id. at 240.
370. This conclusion is based on the premise that all communities find pedophiles, and that which
is marketed toward them, to be patently offensive. See JENKINS, supra note 68, at 4 ("Since child
pornography first entered the public consciousness... [it] has been regarded as an extreme and
unforgivable form of deviance ... For child pornography .... there is no. . . minoritarian school
that upholds the rights of individuals to pursue their private pleasures.") A possible exception may
be images of minors who appear to be sixteen or seventeen years of age. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at
240 (recognizing that depictions of young children may be obscene even though depictions of older
adolescents engaged in the same acts may not be). Material depicting seventeen-year-olds that is
pandered as material involving minors may still be considered obscene, to the extent that pandering
may contribute to a finding of obscenity. See Ginzburg v. United States. 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966):
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 257-58.
371. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 240.
372. Id.
373. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1460-66 (2000).
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only obscene materials would be redundant. 374 However, to the extent that
the CPPA reaches materials that are merely indecent or disturbing or that do
have value, the majority may very well be correct in finding that there is no
compelling interest in proscribing them.375 Justice O'Connor interpreted the
statute exactly that way, concluding that the government sought to regulate
pornography that is "merely indecent," and yet she still concluded that there
was a compelling interest in regulating virtual images.376 Justice O'Connor
did not explain what "merely indecent" child pornography is, or how it can
possibly cause all the problems the government claimed it causes.377
Perhaps Justice O'Connor was thinking of the type of video at issue in
United States v. Knox, which involved young girls dancing in abbreviated
attire in which the camera focused on clothed genital areas. 37 8 This example
illustrates just how limited the class of materials under consideration would
be if the discussion focuses on non-obscene, sexually explicit images of
children.379
Therefore, while Congress probably did not intend the CPPA to apply to
images with serious value, it probably also did not intend the statute to be
limited to obscene materials. The problem is in conceiving what materials
without serious literary, artistic, or social value remain "merely indecent," as
Justice O'Connor described it,38° or what materials are "hard core
pornographic," as Chief Justice Rehnquist described it,381 without being
obscene. Perhaps the question of whether such materials exist could be left
to the jury. Or perhaps, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's model, prosecutors
are simply alleviated of the burden of having to prove that "hard core"
images are obscene.382
Chief Justice Rehnquist probably made the most persuasive argument
regarding the scope of the statute. 383 Broadrick strongly supports avoiding
striking down a statute on overbreadth if a limited view of the statute is
possible.384 Justice O'Connor gave no justification for construing the statute
374. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 240.
375. Id. at 246-49.
376. Id. at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
377. See id.
378. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 750 (3d. Cir. 1994). For further discussion of this video,
see Burke, supra note 67. Although the author would conclude that a video such as this should be
found to be obscene since it is clearly geared toward pedophiles and is exploitative of the girls, it is
conceivable that some communities might conclude otherwise.
379. See Knox, 32 F.3d at 750.
380. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
381. Id. at 269 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
382. See id.
383. Compare Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) ("Application of the overbreadth
doctrine ... is, manifestly, strong medicine."), with Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 268 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (construing the statute narrowly so as to avoid striking it down for overbreadth).
384. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; see also supra note 126.
to reach youthful-looking adults, especially considering the affirmative
defense that the material was made using adults.385 The majority made no
attempt to limit the scope of the statute at all.386
Both Justice O'Connor and the majority also declined to limit §
2456(8)(D) in any way.387 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, first sought to
limit the provision to materials pandered as depicting minors engaged in
sexually explicit conduct.388 If adopted by the majority, this limitation
would have cured the majority and Justice O'Connor's concern that the
pandering provision applied even to works not depicting minors engaged in
sexually explicit conduct.
389
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist wished to impose a scienter
requirement on the provision in order to counter the majority and Justice
O'Connor's conclusion that the provision applied to possessors who had no
responsibility for how the material was pandered.3 90 Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued that X-Citement Video justifies this imposition,39 and, to some
extent, that seems to be a fair assertion.392 However, the statute in X-
Citement Video included the word "knowingly" in its provisions. 393  The
question there was just whether the word "knowingly" in one provision
modified a later provision.394
In the CPPA, however, there is no use of the word "knowingly.
' 395
Congress surely had the option of including the word, with regard to
possessors, if that was its intent. The statute in X-Citement Video indicates
that Congress knows how to impose a "knowing" requirement if it so
desires.396 Oddly enough, despite the lack of any indication that Congress
intended to impose a scienter requirement, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the statute in X-Citement Video "lent itself much less than the
present statute" to an actual scienter requirement.39 7 Although Chief Justice
Rehnquist's suggestion that a scienter requirement would both cure the
majority's concerns and be more consistent with Broadrick's admonitions to
limit statutes rather than strike them down as overbroad is attractive,
Congress simply has not given the Court the authority to construe the statute
in this way.398
Of the many possibilities at the Court's disposal-finding the asserted
interests to be compelling, considering different standards of review,
385. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
386. Id. at 246.
387. Id. at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part); id. at 257-58.
388. Id. at 271-72 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
389. Id. at 257-58; id. at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
390. Id. at 271-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
391. See id. at 273 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
392. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
393. Id. at 68.
394. Id.
395. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242.
396. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68.
397. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 271-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
398. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (West 2003) (amended after Ashcroft decision).
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construing the statute in a more limited way-the fact remains that the Court
chose the conclusion it did. The conclusion the Court reached is not
necessarily wrong; after all, the reasoning of the majority appears to be
sound for the most part.3 99 Certainly the decision shows that the "[C]ourt
continues to be robustly pro-First Amendment. ' '400 A possible conclusion
from the Court's decision is that "[ciutting across ideological lines, the
[C]ourt has evinced a desire to sustain free speech claims against the
interests of government in regulation., 41  True enough. But virtual child
pornography is still a problem, even if the Court does not characterize that
problem as compelling.4 2 The remaining question, then, is what should
Congress do?
III. CONGRESS'S REACTION AND THE FUTURE OF THE CPPA
Soon after the Supreme Court handed down the Ashcroft decision, a
doctor in San Antonio appealed his conviction for possessing child
pornography.4 3  The doctor challenged the conviction because the
government had not been required to prove that the images were real.4°
These appeals were occurring nationwide. 40 5 The concerns and predictions
of opponents of child pornography were becoming a reality. 40 6  Congress
realized the need to act, and on April 30, 2002, a few weeks after the Court
issued its decision in Ashcroft, Representative Lamar Smith introduced an
amendment to the CPPA in the House of Representatives. 40' Then, on May
399. See supra Part II.A.
400. Kenneth W. Starr, The Anthrax Term, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2002, at A 12.
401. Id.
402. See Testimony of Ernest E. Allen, supra note 6.
403. Maro Robbins, Doc Must Serve in Porn Case; Judge Denies Extended Bond During Appeal,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 18, 2002.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 263 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring
and dissenting in part).
407. 148 CONG. REC. H 1769 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002). The bill was identified as H.R. 4623. An
identical bill was introduced in the Senate, identified as S. 2511. Bill Summary & Status for the
107th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Jan. 11, 2003). This bill was clearly a reaction
to problems such as the potential affirmative defense available to defendants. The Congressional
findings accompanying the new bill stated:
The impact on the government's ability to prosecute child pornography offenders is
already evident. The Ninth Circuit has seen a significant adverse effect on prosecutions
since the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Free Speech Coalition. After
that decision, prosecutions generally have been brought in the Ninth Circuit only in the
most clear-cut cases in which the government can specifically identify the child in the
depiction or otherwise identify the origin of the image. This is a fraction of meritorious
child pornography cases. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
testified that, in light of the Supreme Court's affirmation of the Ninth Circuit decision,
prosecutors in various parts of the country have expressed concern about the continued
viability of previously indicted cases as well as declined potentially meritorious
15, 2002, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced an amendment in the Senate,
although this one was somewhat different from the House version.40 8 Both
amendments made attempts to cure the constitutional problems with the
original version of the bill while retaining its purpose.40 9 In fact, the Senate
bill became law on April 30, 2003.4' This portion of this note will first
examine the new law, its advantages, and its disadvantages. This note will
then discuss what a constitutional virtual child pornography law might look
like.
A. Public Law No. 108-21
The new law alters the definition of child pornography to include any
depiction of sexually explicit conduct that is a "digital image, computer
image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from,
that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. ' '411 The law clarifies
that "indistinguishable from" means "virtually indistinguishable, in that the
depiction is such that an ordinary person viewing the depiction would
conclude that the depiction is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit
conduct. ' 4 2  This definition is coupled with an affirmative defense that
allows a defendant to show that the alleged child pornography was (1)
"produced using an actual person," (2) that the "person was an adult [when]
the material was produced," and (3) that the material was "not produced
using any actual minor[s]. 4 t3
Initially, this new definition has superficial appeal because it is clearly
aimed at images found on the internet.414 The more limited aim of the law
and its stream-lined definition excludes films such as American Beauty,
Traffic, and Romeo and Juliet, which the Ashcroft Court expressed concern
about including.415 The problem that remains with the definition is that it
proscribes computer images without regard to value. 4 16 Many value-laden
prosecutions.
H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002), Cong. Finding 9.
408. 148 CONG. REC. S4387-02 (daily ed. May 15, 2002). The Bill was identified as S. 2520. Id.
A later version, apparently identical to the first, was reintroduced in the Senate on January 13, 2003.
149 CONG. REC. S237 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2003). This time, the bill was identified as S. 151. Id.
409. See H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 151, 108th Cong. (2003).
410. Bill Summary and Status for the 108th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited August
19, 2003). The House bill was passed in the House on June 25, 2002. Bill Summary and Status for
the 107th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Aug. 19, 2003). It was then referred to the
Senate, where it died in committee. Id.
411. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502 (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000).
412. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502 (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11) (2000).
413. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502 (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A) (2000).
414. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501(6) (2003) (finding that "[t]he vast majority of child
pornography prosecutions today involve images contained on computer hard drives, computer disks,
and/or related media").
415. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246-48 (2002). These films are
distinguishable from films using real minors.
416. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502 (2003) (proscribing digital or computer images but not
specifically excluding works which have literary, artistic, or scientific value).
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images may fall within the scope of the statute merely because of the method
by which they were created.4 7 Currently, many legitimate films are made
using virtual actors. 4 '8  For example, the film Jurassic Park was created
using digital images, as was Titanic.419  Therefore, a movie addressing
themes similar to those addressed in American Beauty and Traffic that used
"virtual actors" instead of real, youthful-looking adults would fall within the
scope of the statute.4 2°
The defendant is able to address this concern with the affirmative
defense by showing that the film was not made using an actual minor.421
This expanded affirmative defense probably cures the Court's concern with
the scope of the defense.422 However, the Court's concern with using an
affirmative defense to cure problems with an otherwise defective definition
is not addressed by this defense.42 3  Legitimate filmmakers may still be
"chilled," even if their work is not ultimately subject to prosecution, if their
only guard against prosecution is an affirmative defense. 424  It seems
preferable not to include these legitimate films in the scope of the statute at
all. 425 At the same time, the affirmative defense removes from the statute
valueless works that were created without using a real child; virtual child
pornography created entirely by electronic means may cause the problem the
statute seeks to remedy but are not included.426
The pandering provision of the new law adds a "knowing" requirement,
does not include possession, and requires the material to be pandered as
obscene.427 The provision does not include possessors to the extent that (1)
they are not explicitly mentioned, and (2) unlike the original CPPA, the
provision against pandering is not included within the definition of child
pornography.428  Accordingly, the Court's concerns regarding how
417. See id.
418. See Anderson, supra note 345, at 393.
419. Id. at 394 ("All of these feats have been accomplished using sophisticated computer graphics
software that blurs the distinction between imagination and reality.").
420. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502 (2003). The statute does add a definition to "sexually explicit
conduct" that requires "graphic" depictions. Id. The definition of "graphic" requires that the viewer
be able to "observe any part of the genitals or pubic area of any depicted person or animal during
any part of the time that the sexually explicit conduct is being depicted." Id. While this would
exclude many films of value that are intended for general audiences, there is no clear reason to
conclude that a film that does depict the genitals of the virtual actors is necessarily without value.
421. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502 (2003).
422. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255 (expressing concern over the defense's scope); Joseph J. Beard,
Virtual Kiddie Porn: A Real Crime? An Analysis of the PROTECT Act, 21 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3. 5
(2003) (discussing this affirmative defense and noting that its scope is appropriate).
423. Beard, supra note 422, at 5.
424. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 630 (1973) (discussing chilled speech).
425. See discussion infra Part III.B.
426. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 503 (2003).
427. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 503 (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A) (2000).
428. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 503 (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A) (2000).
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possessors will be treated under the pandering provision have been cured.429
However, it is unclear how adding the word "obscene" cures the
problems with the statute punishing activity that is unrelated to the content
of the material.43 ° Whether the pandering provision applies only to obscene
materials, or to all sexually explicit materials depicting minors, the Ashcroft
Court's concern was that a person could be punished for pandering materials
even if the content is perfectly protected.431 Just because the pandering
conveys the impression that material is obscene does not mean that it is
obscene.432  The Court emphasized that pandering was relevant, "as an
evidentiary matter," to the question of whether materials are obscene, but not
that pandering could be punished regardless of content.433
The new law is arguably a step in the right direction in curing the
problems with the CPPA.434 However, it does not necessarily remedy the
constitutional defects.435 The new definition of child pornography fails to
exclude works of literary, scientific, or artistic value.436 The pandering
provision punishes advertisers regardless of actual content.437 Mark C.
Alexander writes, "[I]n recent years, as Internet pornography has come to
epitomize societal ills ... Congress has responded by grandstanding, passing
legislation that is, unsurprisingly, invalidated by the courts for failing
constitutional standards. In seeking politically expedient symbolism without
regard to the Constitution, Congress has failed. 438  Whether or not this
statement applies to Public Law No. 108-21, another congressional failure
surely cannot ameliorate the problems of virtual child pornography.4 39
429. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2003) ("Materials falling
within the proscription are tainted and unlawful in the hands of all who receive it, though they bear
no responsibility for how it was marketed, sold, or described .... As a consequence, the CPPA...
prohibits possession of material described, or pandered, as child pornography by someone
earlier .... ).
430. See id. at 257 (noting that the congressional findings supporting the CPPA are silent on the
evils of pandering). The law does not purport to require the pandered material to contain any
particular content. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 503 (2003). In fact, just the opposite is true: "The
provision makes clear that no actual materials need exist; the government establishes a violation with
proof of the communication and requisite specific intent." S. REP. No. 108-002 (2003), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov.
431. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 257-58.
432. See id. at 257 (noting that the phrase "conveys the impression" requires "little judgment
about the content of the image").
433. Id. at 257-58.
434. See generally discussion this section. In addition, the new law has additional provisions that
are meant to buttress enforcement of laws against child pornography that are outside the scope of
this paper. See Pub. L. No. 108-21 (2003).
435. See generally discussion this section; see also Beard, supra note 422, at 5 (discussing
potential constitutional difficulties with Pub. L. No. 108-21).
436. See Pub. L. No. 108-21 (setting forth no requirement regarding value).
437. See id. at § 503.
438. Mark C. Alexander, The First Amendment and Problems of Political Viability: The Case of
Internet Pornography, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 977,977-78 (2002).
439. See id.
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B. A Picture of a Constitutional Bill
The first and most obvious way of avoiding constitutional problems
with a regulation of virtual child pornography is to require, pure and simple,
that it be obscene."n° If the law adheres to the Miller standard, there will be
no doubt at all that it is constitutional. 44 1 However, there are a few reasons
why simply requiring obscenity is not desirable. First, a law requiring
obscenity would be redundant because obscene images are proscribed in a
different statute.4 2  However, even if a distinction can be made between
regulations of virtual child pornography requiring obscenity and obscenity
laws themselves-such as enhancing punishments if minors are involved in
an obscene depiction-a requirement of obscenity would interfere with the
goals of stamping out all virtual child pornography. While requiring that the
prosecution show obscenity would be a relatively small burden-probably
the vast majority of images depicting children in sexually explicit conduct
are obscene in even the most tolerant communities of our society4"-simply
making the distinction puts prosecutors in the difficult position of proving
whether or not the depiction uses a real child. If the depiction uses a real
child, and a showing of obscenity is therefore excused, 444 the prosecution
would have to prove a real child was used, a burden already shown to be
440. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically settled by the
Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.").
441. See id. at 24.
442. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1460-1466 (2000); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,
239 (2003).
443. See JENKINS, supra note 68, at 4; supra note 376 (discussing community standards as they
relate to child pornography). There is much discussion about the insufficiency of the current Miller
standard because of its requirement that the material be judged accordingly to community, as
opposed to national, standards. See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 48. However, in the author's opinion
these arguments are probably making too much of the variations between various communities'
standards. While there may be real discrepancies with regard to pornography depicting adults, it is
hard to imagine which communities would not find depictions of children to be "patently offensive,"
especially given the definition of sexually explicit conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (2000)
(defining "sexually explicit conduct" is as "actual or simulated ... sexual intercourse, including
genital -genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or
opposite sex; ... bestiality; ... masturbation; ... sadistic or masochistic abuse; ... or lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person"). While there may be variations from
community to community with regard to the image discussed in Knox (the young girls dancing), see
32 F.3d 733, 750 (3d. Cir. 1994), or with regard to pictures of young girls provocatively clad, few
people would find actual depictions of minors engaged in sex to be merely indecent after
determining those images had no other value. While Justice Kennedy noted that "[p]ictures of what
appear to be 17-year-olds engaging in sexually explicit activity do not in every case contravene
community standards," this statement is probably only true if the material has value. See Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002). If there was in fact proof that the material without
value depicted someone who appeared to be seventeen, as opposed to eighteen, many people would
be offended that minors were in fact the targets of the material or that the material was pandered.
444. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (allowing the prohibition of non-obscene
child pornography because of the state's interest in protecting children from exploitation and abuse).
difficult to meet.445  If the depiction does not use a real child, or the
prosecution cannot show that it does, the prosecution must basically treat the
charge as a charge of obscenity." 6  The result, given the difficulty of
distinguishing between real and virtual child pornography, would probably
be a negative effect on prosecutions of real child pornographers by imposing
an obscenity requirement where it did not exist before."7
Aside from requiring obscenity, the area where the majority gave the
most guidance with regard to the constitutionality of a statute regulating
virtual pornography was when the Court stated that, in order to uphold the
statute, the Court would have to find that virtual child pornography is wholly
without First Amendment protection.448 The Court implied, notwithstanding
Justice Thomas's assertion that an affirmative defense could save the
statute, 49 that this was the only way the statute could have survived.45 °
Clearly, as it was written, the Court refused to make this finding.45'
However, the main basis for this may have been not that virtual child
pornography is itself worthy of protection, but that the statute captured so
much other material that is worthy of protection.452 Therefore, perhaps the
key to writing a constitutional statute is writing one that could persuade the
Court to find virtual child pornography wholly without protection. 453 The
key to doing this is to look at the types of materials that the Court has
already declared to be without protection.454  Obscenity, fighting words,
defamation-according to the Court, all of these types of speech are, at their
core, valueless.455 While the Court made it clear in Ashcroft that secondary
harms cannot be the justification for the law,456 clearly these harms play
some role in the Court's analysis.457 Otherwise, there would be no reason
for obscenity law at all.458 There would be no reason to criminalize
obscenity if the Court were not concerned with its effects, regardless of the
Court's refusal to regulate based on a clear and present danger.459 Likewise,
the Court may consider the harms of virtual child pornography if it is
convinced it has no value. 460 Therefore, the key is to define virtual child
445. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000), Cong. Finding 5.
446. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
447. Compare Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57, with Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256.
448. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 245-46.
449. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
450. See id. at 255-56.
451. Id. at 256.
452. Id. at 241.
453. See id.
454. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1973).
455. See id.
456. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250-58.
457. See id.
458. See id.
459. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing the clear and present danger
doctrine).
460. Compare Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241 (describing the valuable speech captured in the statute),
with Miller, 413 U.S. at 20-21 (describing "valueless" speech).
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pornography in such a way that everything that is captured in the statute is
valueless.
46
'
First, therefore, in defining virtual child pornography, "appears to be"
should be changed to "virtually indistinguishable from," just as the current
law does.462 This will probably succeed in excluding many films with value
from falling within the statute. 63  Hollywood films are probably
distinguishable from virtual child pornography simply because they are
marketed to general audiences. 464 Additionally, it will most likely exclude
youthful-looking adults because youthful-looking adults are distinguishable
from children.465 If the identity of the adults in the material is known, the
material will clearly be distinguishable from virtual child pornography. To
be sure that youthful-looking adults are not included within the statute, the
affirmative defense used by the new law is probably sufficient-the
defendant can prove that only adults were used, but the material still cannot
be obscene.466
Granted, the use of an affirmative defense that youthful-looking adults
were used, even if the material is valueless (although not obscene), may cut
against the overall efficacy of the statute. Perhaps all the harms caused by
child pornography, aside from harm to a child, can be caused equally by
youthful-looking adult pornography. 67 Surely the center of gravity is that
pornography depicting children that has no value contributes to a culture of
pedophilia and increases the danger of rape, whether real children were used
or not.468 Why make an exception for youthful-looking adults?
First, the Court in Ashcroft made clear that it will not tolerate the
inclusion of youthful-looking adults in the statute.469 Although the Court's
ground for refusing to include youthful-looking adults was that much of this
material has value, 470 the inclusion of youthful-looking adults implicates
adult pornography. The inclusion of what is provably a depiction of an adult
461. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241; Miller, 413 U.S. at 20-21.
462. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502 (2003).
463. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246-248; id at 268 (Rehnquist, CI., dissenting). Contra Beard,
supra note 422, at 5 (stating that it is not clear that "virtually indistinguishable from" cures the
Court's concerns).
464. To explain further, child pornography is not generally marketed. There are no previews,
television commercials, or print ads for child pornography. Therefore, if a movie is marketed as a
Hollywood film, the way that American Beauty or Traffic were, that is an indication to the audience
that the film is not child pornography. Any indication that the film is not child pornography makes
the film distinguishable from child pornography.
465. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
466. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502 (2003).
467. See Statement of Anne M. Coughlin, supra note 176.
468. Id.
469. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250-51 (citing Ferber for proposition that youthful-looking adults can
be used); id. at 261-63 (O'Connor, J.. concurring and dissenting in part) (concurring with the
majority with regard to youthful-looking adult pornography).
470. See id. at 250-51.
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engaged in sexually explicit activity on the justification that the adult looks
like a child may raise particular concerns.4 7' In Hudnut, the Seventh Circuit
struck down a statute that defined pornography as the sexually explicit
subordination of women.472 The justification for the statute was similar to
that in Ashcroft: it was essentially aimed at eradicating the negative effects
of pornography.473 Nevertheless, the depictions were protected.474 Perhaps
Hudnut stands for the proposition that pornography featuring adults is
difficult to regulate with a content-based restriction, no matter what its
effects .
The strength in including youthful-looking adult pornography-which
are depictions of children regardless of the source-is that it would enhance
the completeness of the statute. However, as the Court has rejected the
effects argument as a justification for regulating virtual child pornography,
the inclusion would be tantamount to a restriction on adult pornography
based on its content.4 76 Such a restriction would likely cause constitutional
problems absent a full obscenity requirement. 477 This may be especially true
to the extent that the virtual child pornography statute may be aimed at
creating a wholly unprotected category of speech.478  The inclusion of
pornography using adults in this category creates tension with the obscenity
requirements that have already been imposed on sexually-oriented speech
using adults.479
Second, a constitutional law should include a provision that requires the
material have no artistic, scientific, or political value.480 The intention is to
define the material to be without value to increase the likelihood that it
would be found to be without First Amendment protection.48' The
prosecutor should not have the same burden as he or she has with a showing
471. See Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
472. Id. at 324.
473. Id. at 325.
474. Id.
475. See id. Content-neutral regulations have been upheld. See City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986); see also supra notes 314-18 and accompanying text
(discussing content neutrality versus content-based statutes).
476. See Statement of Anne M. Coughlin, supra note 176 ("According to the Court's analysis, the
criminalization of pornography is not justified based on claims about secondary harms-no matter
how painful.").
477. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973). In Miller, the Court upheld restrictions
on obscene speech involving adults on the ground that obscenity has no value; the Court did not
discuss the secondary harms of pornography at all. Id.
478. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting).
479. See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982); Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
480. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246 (expressing concern that the CPPA prohibited speech with
"serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"). This showing, of course, would be in the
alternative to showing that the material was made using a real, identifiable minor. See Ferber, 458
U.S. at 747. This is consistent with the construction of the original § 2256(8)(B) and with the new
amended version. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 502-03 (2003). This suggested requirement is not to
be construed as requiring obscenity or a modified version of obscenity.
481. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246.
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of obscenity. 482 This proposed statute would avoid subjective community
standards because the value standard is objective, asking what a reasonable
person would conclude. 483 Another alternative may be, rather than imposing
a showing of lack of value on the prosecution, creating an affirmative
defense in which the defendant can show the material has value.484  The
advantage to this option, although there still would be some risk in imposing
this burden on the defendant,485 is that there would not be any difference
between the standards for real and virtual child pornography for the
prosecution, and accordingly, the prosecution would not have to prove that a
real child was used.486
A final step in limiting the scope of the statute would be to define
"sexually explicit" as "actual or indistinguishable from actual" sexually
explicit conduct.487 The "simulated" language currently used increases the
likelihood that harmless material will be captured.488  However, the
exclusion of the "simulated" language would impose a burden on the
prosecutor to show that the sexual conduct is real.4 89  The use of the
language "indistinguishable from actual" or similar language is close to
Chief Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that only hard-core pornography need
be reached.49 °
The pandering provision contained in the new law will probably survive
constitutional scrutiny but for one additional change: there must actually be
some requirements pertaining to the content of the material.49' It is not
enough that the material be pandered in a certain way if the actual content of
the material is protected.492 Taking the new definition and requiring that the
material actually meet the definition of child pornography would certainly
meet constitutional standards.493 The strength of this provision would not be
482. See supra discussion this section regarding why an obscenity requirement is undesireable.
483. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
484. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (finding that a properly
crafted affirmative defense could cure a constitutional defect).
485. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256 ("The Government raises serious constitutional difficulties by
seeking to impose on the defendant the burden of proving his speech is not unlawful.").
486. That is, as long as there is a difference between standards for real and virtual child
pornography, the prosecution would have to show which type of pornography was being prosecuted.
The way to show this is inevitably showing whether a real child was used or not used.
487. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502 (2003) (defining sexually explicit as "actual or simulated"
conduct).
488. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 263 (disapproving inclusion of "simulated" sex).
489. See id.
490. See id. at 270 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The new law attempts to cure this problem by
requiring the actual depiction of genitals. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502 (2003).
491. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 257 (disagreeing with the government's assumption that whether
pandering "conveys the impression" that a work is of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct
is dependent upon the actual content of the work).
492. See id.
493. See id. at 243.
particularly strong, but the Court has stated that legislative findings on the
issue of child pornography are "silent on the evils" of images simply
pandered in a certain way.49  Without any clearly identified harm to be
cured, the weakening of the pandering provision would probably not hurt the
overall effectiveness of the statute.495
After limiting the definition of child pornography in these four ways, it
is hard to conceive of any material that would fall within its provisions that
would be considered valuable. In its congressional findings, in addition to
emphasizing the government objectives that have already been accepted as
valuable, Congress should emphasize the lack of value in what it seeks to
ban.496 If no material of any value is to be captured in the statute, the Court
may very well find the asserted governmental interests adequate in a
balancing test.4 97 In fact, the Court intimated that it would.
4 98
In summary, an amendment that (1) changed "appears to be" to
"virtually indistinguishable from;" (2) defined the material in the statute as
that which is without literary, social, political, or scientific value; (3)
changed "simulated" sexual activity to "apparently actual;" and (4)
maintained an affirmative defense that real, adult actors were used and that
the material is not obscene would hopefully withstand constitutional
scrutiny.499 The material that fell within this definition would be comparable
to obscenity and child pornography in that it has no value.50 0 The possibility
of material with value is probably what kept the Court from applying the
balancing test from Miller and Ferber.50 1 After clearing the "value" hurdle,
the Court may be persuaded that the asserted governmental interests
outweigh the value of the material.50 2 Virtual child pornography would
become another category of unprotected speech.50 3
The advancements of technology have outstripped Ferber.5  A
continued reliance on Ferber as the justification for regulation of child
pornography will never help lawmakers come to a constitutional conclusion
on the regulation of virtual child pornography.0 5 Ferber was a case that, at
the time it was decided, could not provide justifications for bans on virtual
child pornography because such a thing did not exist-the rationale of
Ferber did not reject regulation of virtual child pornography because it did
494. Id. at 257.
495. See id.
496. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501 (2003); H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002). It may be ineffective
for Congress to emphasize all the secondary harms associated with child pornography. See
Statement of Anne M. Coughlin, supra note 176.
497. See supra notes 348-56 and accompanying text.
498. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246.
499. See supra notes 440-95 and accompanying text.
500. See supra notes 440-95 and accompanying text.
501. See supra notes 339-52 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 353-56 and accompanying text.
503. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
504. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501 (2003), Cong. Finding 4 (describing the technology which was not
available in 1982 when Ferber was decided).
505. See id.
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not contemplate it.506 With the use of the internet, pornographers, whether
peddling real or virtual images, can easily go undetected. 5 7 The problem,
largely caused by technology, of detecting the pornography is compounded
when there must be a showing that the pornography is real; identifying the
original source to determine whether a real child was used is practically
impossible.5 8 As changes in technology occur, it becomes important for
courts to step away from previous justifications and look ahead toward the
changing needs of society. The first federal obscenity statute, enacted in
1842, did not cover photographs; the technology was not in widespread use
at the time.509  Subsequently, Congress amended the statute to include
photographs, recognizing that as technology changes, the law must
change.510 A similar adjustment must occur here. As much as there must be
a recognition that Ferber can no longer be the definitive word on child
pornography, this progression can be done within a traditional legal
framework-the framework that allows some categories of speech to be
proscribed because they are completely without value.5 1'
IV. CONCLUSION
Representative Nick Lampson of Texas commented after the Ashcroft
decision that "[t]he Supreme Court has sent a terrible message, one that is
terrible to send to the pornographic community that this behavior is okay. '12
It is unfortunate that this message was given because it is not true. The large
amount of virtual child pornography that is obscene has never been, nor is it
likely to ever be, protected by the First Amendment.5 13 But Congress has
nonetheless amended the CPPA, and this is probably laudable given the very
plausible arguments that child pornography, whether it uses real children or
not, causes some serious problems that are only going to grow with
advancements in technology. 51 4 It is also unfortunate that the new statute
still suffers from constitutional defects. 51  However, a statute that only
proscribes materials undeserving of First Amendment protection will surely
506. See id.
507. JENKINS, supra note 68, at 215 ("Despite all the enforcement efforts in recent years, it is still
remarkably easy for any reasonably discreet person to pursue this highly illegal conduct
indefinitely.").
508. See generally id.
509. Donna I. Dennis. Obscenit, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century
United States, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 369, 384 (2002).
510. Id.
511. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1973).
512. 148 CONG. REC. H 1344-07 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 2003) (statement by Rep. Lampson).
513. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
514. See, e.g., Statement of Anne M. Coughlin, supra note 176; Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501 (2003),
Cong. Findings 6-10.
515. See supra notes 411-39 and accompanying text.
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not chip away at the First Amendment and yet will be able to remedy
concerns about how virtual child pornography affects children, pedophiles,
and prosecutors.
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